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Abstract 
 
The petroleum industry plays a big role in the economy of oil-exporting countries 
such as Norway and Nigeria. So while the countries depend on their petroleum 
resource to literally “fuel the economy”, studies have shown that macroeconomic 
activity and fluctuations in oil prices are not significantly linked and thus do not 
completely describe the sector’s performance. It is therefore that other factors, such as 
the design of the institutional frameworks, could be instrumental in driving the 
sector’s performance and creating value. As studies in resource management point to 
an institutional dimension, this paper explores the role of institutional frameworks as 
well as fiscal regimes in deriving value from the petroleum resources for Norway and 
Nigeria respectively. The countries are chosen because they share similarities in the 
origins of their petroleum industries but have since taken different paths to exhibit 
diverse petroleum sector performance.  
The paper studies the factors that create, affect and negate value creation for Norway 
and Nigeria in a qualitative sense to restrict the scope of the paper. The paper presents 
a comparative study of gauging the factors for each country in its respective context 
of creating value in the petroleum industry. 
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1 Motivation 
 
Norway and Nigeria are both rich in fossil fuel reserves. Although it might seem 
strange to interface these two countries when making a comparative analysis given 
the politico-socio-economic diversity that they exhibit, the countries do share a 
common thread in terms of discovery of oil, production capacity and the economy 
driven by the oil wealth. 
A common aspect that the countries share is the period of oil discovery and 
embarking as an oil producer. In Norway, oil was first stuck in December 1969 and 
production started June 15, 1971 (NPD, 2013). Whereas, oil discovery in Nigeria 
dates back to 1956, when Shell-BP discovered oil in Oloibiri in the Niger Delta with 
the earliest oil production starting in 1958 at 5,100 bbl/d (NNPC, 2014).  
According to BP Statistical Review (2013), Norway has proven oil reserves of 7.5 
thousand million barrels of oil constituting 0.4% of world’s proven reserves while 
Nigeria has total proved oil reserves of 37.2 thousand million barrels of oil, which 
constitute 2.4% of the world’s proven reserves. Interestingly however, in terms of 
production, Norway constitutes 1.9 million barrels per day while Nigeria is at 2.4 
million barrels per day, making these two countries the biggest oil producers in 
Europe and Africa respectively.  
Oil revenues also form a major chunk of the Norwegian and Nigerian economies, as 
the petroleum industry is the biggest industry for both. Ending 2012, the oil and gas 
exports formed 52% of total exports, 30% share of government revenues and formed 
23% of GDP for Norway (NPD, 2013). For Nigeria ending 2012, the oil and gas 
exports formed 96.8% of total exports for contributing 75.3% share of government 
revenues and forming 19.6% of GDP (CBN, 2012) 
Also while Norway invests it’s oil revenues in the Government Pension Fund Global - 
often cited as the most successful sovereign wealth fund in the world, as of 2011 
Nigeria has followed suit by starting the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority 
with a seed capital of $1million (NSIA, 2014). Even with the above similarities, the 
countries have differently preforming petroleum industry. The motivation for this 
paper lies in understanding this very difference.  
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2 Research Question 
 
When a nation depends heavily on its non-renewable natural resource(s) such as oil, 
its economy is exposed to fluctuations in the global commodity prices. As noted 
above, oil revenues do form a big portion of the government revenue, export revenue 
and GDP, which could make both countries vulnerable to oil price shocks. It could be 
postulated that their GDP growth might have some correlation with the oil prices. 
Comparing the GDP growths for Norway and Nigeria in the graph below, it can be 
seen that the two curves differ. 
Figure 1: GDP growth rate: Norway and Nigeria 
 
Source: World Bank 
While Nigeria’s GDP growth shows a greater correlation with the positive oil price 
shock of the 1970s as well as seems being impacted by the closely followed negative 
oil price shocks1, Norway’s seem pretty stable. 
The graph thus forms the motivation for this report. Why is it that Norway has a better 
performing petroleum sector than Nigeria and what are the factors that determine 
sound natural resource management? The aspects that influence the manner in which 
a nation manages it’s natural resources can be broadly classified in three ways; 
namely 
• The institutional framework for managing the resources – The industry 
organisation and the business environment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Post the discovery of oil in Norway and Nigeria, the major oil price shocks were in 1973, 1980 when 
oil prices peaked around $55 and $100 per barrel in $2012 terms. More recently, oil prices peaked 
around $100 per barrel in $2012.  
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• The fiscal regimes to extract the resource rent thereby converting a non-
renewable resource into a renewable monetary resource. 
• The policies and frameworks to pump the resources back into the system to 
promote the economic activity of the country. 
This paper focuses on the first two aspects. The aim is twofold 
• To gain an insight into the petroleum industry of Norway and Nigeria by 
studying the institutional frameworks and fiscal regimes directly affecting it. 
• To understand what factors determine value creation in the petroleum industry 
and exactly how these countries aim to maximise their resource rent. 
The paper starts with the literature review in Section 3, which is followed by giving a 
lens to understand the analysis process better. Further organisation of the report is as 
follows. Section 4 presents the role of institutional frameworks in value creation from 
the lens of political economy. The section starts by analysing the history of oil 
industry evolution in Norway and Nigeria with a special focus on the evolution of 
their respective National Oil Companies (NOCs). The sector organisation is then 
presented and analysed from the perspective of the Governance Indicators by the 
World Bank. The section concludes by analysing the lifecycle of petroleum 
operations in both countries and how it creates more value for the respective States2. 
Section 5 presents the role of the fiscal frameworks present in Norway and Nigeria to 
capture value i.e. to capture the bulk of the resource rent generated. The various fiscal 
and non-fiscal instruments used by the States are studied, while attempting to 
understand the rationale behind the choice of each. The section concludes by a brief 
overview of fiscal policies that exist in Norway and Nigeria and how it is also 
creating and adding value to the State. Section 6 presents the other side of the story in 
enlisting factors that affect value creation in Nigeria through the introduction of ‘The 
Nigerian Cost Factor’. These factors do not strictly lie within the institutional 
framework or fiscal regimes but still have some overlaps with both. 
Finally, Section 7 summarises the main findings in this study and concludes the paper. 
It connects the dots through the various factors discussed in the above sections to 
fully understand their role in value creation for Norway and Nigeria.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The word ‘State’ or ‘States’ is used to refer to Norway and Nigeria as per the context. 
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3 Literature Review 
 
The literature review is broadly grouped in three categories. The first category is 
Resource Curse. Literature in natural resource management is abundant on this 
phenomenon. It also presents a good lens to start the research as Norway and 
Nigeria lie at the opposite ends of the spectrum of the resource curse syndrome. 
The second category is Oil Price shocks and it’s impacts on macroeconomic 
activity. It is important to consider this perspective to understand if oil prices 
alone indeed have a significant impact on the macroeconomic activity for Norway 
and Nigeria since the macroeconomic activity is an indication of value creation. 
The third category is Role of institutional frameworks on oil sector governance. 
The literature in this category provides a backbone to the analysis of value 
creation due to design of institutional frameworks. Finally, the fourth category is 
Role of fiscal regimes in resource rent extraction, which sets the foundation for 
analysing the value captured from petroleum resources by fiscal regimes in 
Norway and Nigeria. 
3.1 Resource Curse 	  
The Resource Curse phenomenon is based on the observation that countries rich 
in mineral resources often have poor governance structure, weak institutions and 
inequitable distribution of the resource wealth among the citizens of the state. So 
while Nigeria suffers from Resource Curse, Norway seems to have found a way to 
avoid it.  
Frankel (2010) performed an econometric analysis to conclude that mere 
possession of natural resources does not lead to the resource curse syndrome. 
Rather, factors such as commodity price volatility, the Dutch Disease, political 
and civil unrest and poor institutional quality sets stage for a resource curse. Karl 
(2006) emphasises that the resource curse problem is more political than 
economic. Robinson et al. (2006) illustrate the role of political incentives 
generated by resource endowment as key to identifying if resource abundance 
leads to curse or a blessing. Barma et al. (2012) have indicated that governance 
indicators for most-resource rich developing countries are poor, thereby attesting 
that the resource curse has an institutional dimension. 
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3.2 Oil price shocks and it’s impacts on macroeconomic activity 
 
A number of factors influence oil price than the mere economic dynamics of the 
demand and supply functions. As noted earlier, for economies that are heavily 
dependent on rents generated from non-renewables, shocks in global commodity 
prices can have some impact on the macroeconomic activity. The perspective is 
important since Norway and Nigeria are both heavily dependent on oil and do 
bear the risk of exposing their economies to volatility in oil prices. 
 
Iwayemi and Fowowe (2011) analyse the relationship between oil price shocks 
and impacts on macroeconomic activity in net oil-exporting developing countries 
with Nigeria being one of the four countries analysed. Their findings suggest that 
oil price shocks do not significantly affect the macroeconomic indicators in the 
short run. A noteworthy observation drawn from the study is that the growth rate 
of (manufacturing) output and capital formation decreases from a positive shock 
and increases from a negative shock. In their conclusion, the authors also indicate 
that policy aspects do have a role to play in cushioning from oil price shocks. 
  
Chuku (2012) studies the effect of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables in 
Nigeria such as the CPI, real oil prices, real GDP, and foreign reserves. The study 
starts with the observations that the above macroeconomic indicators do not 
exactly mirror the trends in oil price development. The author concludes that such 
shocks are not indicative of the Nigerian macroeconomic activity. However, the 
study bears the same results as Iwayemi and Fowowe (2011), when studying the 
impact of oil price shocks while adding that the shocks merely cause inflation in 
the short run. The study thereby draws attention to the fact that the role of oil price 
should be deemphasised when charting national development plans for Nigeria. 
 
Literature focusing on oil price shocks for developed economies mostly centre on 
the US. Mork (1989) concludes that the effect of negative oil shocks do not affect 
the macroeconomic activity in the US while the same cannot be said for positive 
shocks. 
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Jiménez-Rodrígueza & Sánchez (2005) in their paper on oil price shocks in 
OECD countries, have suggested that positive oil price shocks impact the 
Norwegian GDP positively while the negative shocks do not have a much 
significant impact. The same is not true for UK however, even though Norway 
and UK are both net oil-exporting countries. The authors also mention that the 
real exchange rate appreciation is much stronger for UK than for Norway in the 
light of positive shocks, which then make adjustments difficult in times of 
negative shocks. The author also draws attention to the dispersion hypothesis that 
indicates that oil price affects the output through dispersed allocation across 
various sectors (Lilien, 1982). What this means is that an oil price increase would 
contract an oil-intensive sector while giving impetus to an energy efficient sector. 
Through the available literature the consensus is clear, for developing as well as 
developed net oil-exporting countries, that positive oil price shocks spell good 
news while negative shocks do not affect macroeconomic activity to a large extent. 
This result is noteworthy because oil price shocks can now be treated exogenous 
to oil-exporting countries’ macroeconomic activity. It is thus possible that the 
macroeconomic activity, which has a significant share of the non-renewable 
resource rent, could be affected by endogenous factors. As most authors also point 
towards the role of institutions in oil sector governance, it could be the factor 
affecting the macroeconomic activity, which is what we turn to next. 
3.3 Role of institutional frameworks in oil sector governance 
 
Several authors acknowledge the role of sound institutional framework in oil and 
gas sector performance. Thurber et al. (2011) examine the Norwegian Model of 
petroleum sector management and state that separation of functions in a sound 
regulatory framework has been instrumental for the oil and gas sector’s 
performance in Norway. Hunter (2014) also sheds light on the role of regulatory 
framework in optimizing the petroleum resources by comparing Australia and 
Norway. Hunter’s study concludes that Norway’s objective based policies give a 
better result for petroleum sector performance than Australia’s rule based policies. 
A good way to characterise oil sector performance is taking note of the trend in 
production in producing countries. Toft & Duero (2011) have found that political-
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institutional frameworks do affect the investment environment in the upstream 
sector, which thereby affects production portfolio. Barma et al. (2012) further 
attest that institutional quality and governance make up the quality of economic 
and natural resource management policies adopted and implemented to derive 
economic value from the natural resource.  
When studying institutional framework for oil and gas sector performance, an 
important aspect to consider are the NOCs as they not only control roughly 90% 
of the world’s petroleum reserves but also form an interface to manage the 
political and economic interests of the state in petroleum sector (Boscheck, 2007). 
Thurber et al. (2010) perform an extensive study on how patronage affects the 
performance efficacy of the Nigerian NOC - NNPC and conclude that it has far-
reaching impacts on the sectors’ performance. Thurber & Istad (2010) also study 
the Norwegian NOC – Statoil to illustrate how it has been instrumental in 
managing the State’s interest in petroleum sector management. 
 
The available literature does indicate that the design of the institutional 
frameworks indeed affects petroleum sector performance. Existing literature in 
this aspect can be summarised as the ones that acknowledge and assess the impact 
of institutional design and governance in the petroleum sector performance and 
the ones that illustrate the design of institutions and the regulatory framework. 
Furthermore, it is also important to capture the value created which is focus of the 
fourth category. 
3.4 Role of fiscal regimes in resource rent extraction 
 
Fiscal regimes are important in capturing the value of the non-renewable source 
as revenue to the state. It has been found that a tax regime should be progressive 
and based on profits to capture the bulk of the resource rent (Barma et al., 2012). 
The authors have also found evidence that fiscal regimes tend to be more 
complex and difficult to administer in developing countries with weak-
governance and low capacity than in countries exhibiting strong governance and 
sound technical capacity to administer the tax regime.  
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It is also important to have sound policies that manage the captured resource rent 
as is illustrated by Ushie et al. (2013), when they address the role of institutional 
quality in the macroeconomic activity as a result of positive oil shocks. The 
authors’ recommendations call for a sound institutional structure to manage the 
windfalls from oil shocks. The same view is shared by Budina et al. (2007), who 
conclude that volatility in government expenditures is more responsible for the 
non-performance of the non-oils sector than the Dutch Disease phenomenon. 
Although the core focus of the report is not on how the revenue is spent, this study 
brings to light the economic impact of government policies.  
The fiscal regime should also function in a way that not only minimises economic 
risks to the state but also makes the sector more attractive for oil companies who 
have the know-how to extract the resource out of the ground3. As noted earlier, 
Toft & Duero (2011) have found evidence that investment frameworks do impact 
the manner in which the upstream sector is perceived to be attractive by the IOCs. 
Alternatively, Osmundsen (1999) has noted that the Norwegian state bears a 
greater economic risk and suggests measures to obviate it. 
3.5 Conclusion 	  
In summary, most authors do acknowledge the role of institutional frameworks and 
fiscal regimes in petroleum sector performance. Some also suggest that resource 
curse has an institutional dimension and the choice of fiscal regimes affect 
macroeconomic activity rather than oil price volatility. Some authors study the 
various institutions in greater detail.  
This paper takes a broader overview in combining these insights and studying them 
in the light of the petroleum sector in Norway and Nigeria. These countries present 
an excellent specimen for the study, as they share similar characteristics in terms of 
petroleum production but are also extremely dissimilar in the sector’s performance. 
Moreover, this paper adds to the literature in terms of value creation for the state 
and the oil companies as a result of institutional design and fiscal regime. Effort 
has been made to understand the various factors that contribute, affect as well as 
negate value creation.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Used figuratively to indicate extraction from various geological terrains on land and water. 
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A lens for understanding historic implications in value creation  
Before we delve deeper into comparing Norway and Nigeria for their characteristic 
institutional frameworks and fiscal regimes, it should be emphasised that we are 
comparing two very different countries. Some factors are obvious, such as the fact 
that Norway is a developed high-income OECD country faring excellently on the 
World Development Indicators4. On the other hand, Nigeria is a lower-middle income 
country faring rather poorly even in comparison to other lower-middle income 
countries and sub-Saharan African countries5. 
There are also historic implications contributing towards this difference. It is 
important to keep this in mind, so as to fully appreciate why the institutional 
frameworks in Norway and Nigeria have evolved into what they are. While looking at 
the history of the two countries, three distinctions should be made that help to 
understand the evolution of the institutional frameworks. 
• Demography – In the 1950s, before the discovery of oil in commercial 
quantities, Norway had a small population of a little over 3 million while 
Nigeria was around 38 million. Today Norway consists of 5 million people 
while Nigeria is around 179 million6. The ethnic makeup of Norway is also 
more homogenous as compared to Nigeria. 
• Enterprise Capacity7  - Norway already had good technical capacity in 
managing it’s natural resources like hydro through hydro power production, 
fisheries as well as insights into civil engineering through it’s shipping 
industry. Nigeria on the other hand, was a British colony with cash crops 
driving the economy. Its technically capacity was also limited.  
• Location of reserves – Norway’s petroleum resources are located in the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) in the North Sea while Nigeria’s are 
located in the marshy terrains of the Delta region as well as offshore. 
These simple factors have some serious implications. Firstly, the advantage of having 
a small population in addition to an established enterprise capacity in natural resource 
management made Norway more competent in managing petroleum resources. Also, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Data from World Bank, available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/norway. 
5 Data from World Bank, available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria. 
6 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Populations Division 
7 The term is credited to Al- Kasim (2006) 
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the location of the reserves in the NCS meant that they were far away from human 
interference even in the event of spills, accidents and gas flaring. It also meant that a 
particular domicile group could not make exclusive claims to the resource and to the 
rents it generates. Additionally, a homogenous ethnic group meant that there was no 
animosity in competing for distribution of resource wealth.  
Nigeria is an outcome of the British colonisation that put together different ethnic 
tribes under one administrative colony. Colonisation also meant limiting technical 
capacity of the masses so as to retain power. Being a colony of an active participant of 
the world wars also meant that geopolitical interests in oil were active in Africa with 
European powers having vested interests in their colonies. The interests never faded 
even after gaining independence and the Biafra civil war (1967 - 1970) is testimony to 
the interference of the French and the British in securing access to Nigeria’s oil 
resources. Additionally, the location of reserves inland, the principle of derivation and 
the unfortunate separation of domicile ethnic groups complicate the ownership of the 
resource rent.  
Just by observing these three factors, it can be said that Norway has been in a 
favourable position to better manage it’s petroleum resources while the situation in 
Nigeria was less favourable with factors complicating the value creation process. 
These core factors interplay in the political economy of the two countries and will be 
encountered in various contexts and illustrated in greater detail in the sections that 
follow. There could of course be more factors that shape the status quo in Norway and 
Nigeria, however we restrict the lens to these core factors to gain a better 
understanding of how they interplay and create value for the States especially in the 
context of managing their respective petroleum resources. 
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4 The Role of Institutional Frameworks in Value Creation  
 
Natural resource management entails managing natural resources by a state found 
within its sovereign borders so as to derive value from the resource for the betterment 
of it’s current and future generations. Petroleum resources present various challenges 
to management and value creation given the unique nature of the resource. Not only 
are these resources limited and non-renewable, but they are also of high economic 
value. Moreover, the entire value chain from resource extraction to distribution to the 
end user requires complex technical know-how and high investments in addition to 
mitigating social and environmental risks. Also, because the resource is limited and 
generates high economic rents, capturing the economic value from the non-renewable 
resource and transforming it into sustainable cash flows for the future is not only 
important but also complex. Countries that fail to capture, convert and distribute this 
value suffer from what is known as ‘The Resource Curse’. As the phenomenon is 
linked to institutional quality and governance, it is important to focus on the role of 
the institutional framework in value creation from petroleum resource management. 
Barma et. al (2012) draw attention to the fact that quality of existing institutions is a 
key factor in assessing a resource-dependent country’s economic outcome. This 
section thus performs a comparative analysis on aspects of the institutional 
frameworks in Norway and Nigeria that play a role in maximising value out of the 
petroleum resources. For this section, the State is the primary actor and the aim is to 
check value maximisation from the perspective of the State as the primary stakeholder.  
This section is organised as follows; The first part presents a very brief history of the 
oil industry in highlighting the key events and milestones that set stage for its 
petroleum activities, as it is important to look back at the events that shaped the 
nations’ petroleum sectors as they stand today. This part would illustrate, in greater 
detail, the factors described in the preceding section. This part also presents the 
evolution of the NOCs of Norway and Nigeria, as they are important institutions that 
manage the States’ interest in petroleum activities. The second part presents the way 
the petroleum industry is organised in the light of the World Bank’s governance 
indicators. The third part presents the description of the lifecycle of petroleum 
operations in both countries.  
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For each part, separate instances are presented for Norway and Nigeria following a 
short summary while gaining a closer look at the impacts it has in value creation for 
each State. The section concludes with a summary of key ideas. 
4.1 History of petroleum industry 
 
4.1.1 Norway 
Al-Kasim (2006) gives excellent details for the Norwegian oil industry. The following 
extract on Norwegian oil industry history is summarised from the author’s book. 
Norway was a small country with 3 million people with shipping, fishing and 
hydroelectric industry dominating its economy before the discovery of oil in the NCS 
in 1969. Scepticism had always prevailed with the discovery of oil within Norwegian 
territory as late as 1958. However, major gas discovery in Groningen, Holland in 
1959, accelerated International Oil Company (IOC) activity on the UK side. Norway 
was reluctant on it’s stand with respect to the finer interpretations of the Geneva 
Convention, nevertheless, The Royal Decree of 1963 proclaimed sovereignty of 
Norway over it’s continental shelf. Median-line negotiations were still pending with 
UK to determine fully the extent of NCS under Norway. The negotiations went 
smoothly and were closed before any petroleum activity began and major discoveries 
made. In the meantime, Norway was also making preparations to form a regulatory 
framework to govern the petroleum activities and thus was appointed the Norwegian 
Petroleum Council in 1965. 
1966 marked the first well drilled on the NCS and led to a dedicated three-member 
unit under the Mining Division to overlook oil matters. The discovery of the Cod 
Field encouraged signs of petroleum reserves and led to the expansion of the 
Petroleum Section with personnel from legal, economic, geological and technical 
background being recruited between 1968-1972. Until 1965, 10 licenses were handed 
out to only conduct geological surveys by means of a temporary law. The Royal 
Decree of 9 April 1965 however, laid the foundations for the system of licences that 
exists today. Two types of licenses were awarded; 
Reconnaissance license that gives the holder three years to conduct geological 
surveys over specified areas but without the exclusive right to survey, drill and exploit 
petroleum.  
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Production license, on the other hand, gave the holder the exclusive right to survey, 
drill for and exploit oil in the specified area with each block being approximately 500 
km2 and license period spawning 46 years. However, after the first six years it was 
mandatory to relinquish a third of the license area followed by another third in the 
following three years. The applicant had not only to apply for the production license 
but also pay area fees, royalty and a company tax on net revenues as a result of its 
petroleum activities. 
To keep up the momentum of petroleum exploration, the Second Allocation Round 
was announced between 1969 -1971. This era coincided with the first commercial 
discovery at Ekofisk and the move towards resource nationalisation by the OPEC that 
also persuaded Norway to insist state participation in petroleum activities by IOCs on 
the NCS. The Ministry of Industry, in a report of 12 June 1970 to the Parliament, gave 
the first glimpse of suggestions of the ‘Norwegian Model’ of separation of functions 
necessary to organise and govern the petroleum activities. In the same year, the Royal 
Decree prescribed the HSE standards. 1972 marked the formation of Statoil, 
Norway’s NOC, to manage the State’s interest in the petroleum sector. 
With the second allotment round more discoveries came online and the rising oil price 
of the early 70s made it financially viable for Norway to explore in deep offshore. 
However, concerns also grew large of the impact the newfound oil wealth would have 
on the Norwegian economy. In 1974, the Labour Union submitted a report to the 
Parliament throwing caution to the wind by highlighting the Dutch Disease and 
impact of possible future dependence on oil revenues for Norway. Thus forms the 
cautionary approach of Norway to exploit its petroleum resources while protecting 
domestic industries. The ambition to build local capacity in the petroleum activities 
gave rise to the ‘Norwegian Cost Factor’. 1978 marks the fourth allocation round that 
compels 50% of the R&D in petroleum activities to be done in Norway. In 1979-80, 
IOCs were beginning to complain that it was costlier to produce on the Norwegian 
side than on the UK side owing to the local content obligations imposed by Norway. 
Towards the late 70s a need arises to define a Norwegian oil policy in the light of 
increasing discoveries and oil revenues. Natural gas discoveries also made it 
necessary to appoint a Gas Co-ordination Committee in 1983, to co-ordinate gas 
activities. The Troll contract of 1986 created a commercial outlet for exploiting 
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associated gas. Increased dependence on oil revenues also drew attention to decouple 
public spending from oil revenues and thus was born the Petroleum Fund on the 
recommendations of the Tempo Committee. 
1985 saw the advent of the Petroleum Law in Norway covering the entire life cycle of 
petroleum operations from licensing to decommissioning. The eighties also witnessed 
a strong urge by the state to develop NOC to decrease IOC dependence and secure 
future revenues for the state from petroleum activities. Production peaked in 1987 and 
in the autumn of 1986, the state braced up for the eventual decline by proposing tax 
adjustments as incentives to make newer fields available for development. This bore 
fruit with investments increasing between 1985 -1990 due to new fields and 
construction of gas pipelines. Towards the late 80s in the light of maturing fields in 
the NCS and recovery options being costly, Statoil is partly privatised to prospect for 
oil internationally. 
Today, the Norwegian Petroleum Industry is cited as an example of the most 
successful and transparent industry and the ‘Norwegian Model of Oil Sector 
Governance’ is presented as an ideal template for institutional setup in petroleum-rich 
countries. 
Evolution of Statoil 
Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS, literally translating to The Norwegian State Oil 
Company is today better known as Statoil. As mentioned earlier, the resource 
nationalisation trend of OPEC in the early 70s prompted Norway to consider a NOC 
as a means of resource management. The Parliament report 25 also stated that a state-
owned oil company could help the state avoid the negative impacts of oil 
development through two modes, 1. Controlling the pace of petroleum production and 
2. Having supervisory control over the operation on the NCS (Thurber & Istad, 2010). 
Statoil was incorporated as a limited liability company with two employees on 18th 
September 1972. In 1976, Statoil made its first discovery in Tommeliten. Statoil 
founding CEO, Johansen continually attempted to gain the best acreage and 
favourable licenses to Statoil and also gave impetus to pushing carried interest to the 
NOC. In the 1980s, the State became concerned of the NOC’s power and the 
possibility of it becoming a state within a state. The IOCs on the other hand were 
complaining of partial terms to the NOC. The State therefore decided to clip the 
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NOCs wings by slashing half of Statoil’s holdings and transferring them to State 
Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) in 1985 (Thurber & Istad, 2010). 
Early 90’s saw a change in Statoil through change in leadership and partial 
privatisation of the NOC. In the wake of dwindling domestic reserves, an alliance was 
formed with BP in 1990 that led to international expansion in Angola and Azerbaijan. 
The company was listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange and the New York Stock 
Exchange in 2001. 2007 led to the merger of Norsk Hydro into Statoil to create a 
single dominant Norwegian company representing the State in the petroleum sector.  
Statoil moved up the technological curve with the onset of the technology agreements 
put in place by the State from the Fourth Allocation round in 1979. Thereafter it takes 
credit for technological innovations like the multiphase pipeline of 1982, innovations 
for cutting emissions from petroleum activities in 1991 to name a few. Its first 
experience with unconventional oil was in 1994 in Venezuela. 
Today, Statoil has performed well financially and has demonstrated strong market 
performance. It has succeeded in it’s mission to not only represent the State’s interest 
in firm control over the petroleum resources on the NCS but has also built domestic 
technical capacity and expertise in production and exploration activities in the 
challenging environments such as the NCS (Thurber & Istad, 2010). 
4.1.2 Nigeria 
The petroleum industry history and the evolution of the NOC the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) are inextricably interlinked. Both are characterised by 
dynamics of the political economy of Nigeria emerging as an independent state and 
reaping the benefits of it’s petroleum resources while witnessing changes in 
governances from military regimes to civilian governments. Ethnic tensions also 
colour the political economy of Nigeria, with the North dominated by the Hausa-
Fulani tribes, the West by the Yorubas and the East by the Igbos. 
The brief overview presented below is based on summarising the works of Astebuga 
(1999), Nwokeji (2007), Hosman (2009), and Thurber et.al (2010). 
Pre-independence 
Nigeria already had its first piece of legislation on petroleum in 1889 in the form of 
the Petroleum Ordinance of 1889, which laid the basic framework for development of 
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petroleum and natural resources. This legislation was followed by Mineral Regulation 
(Oil) Ordinance of 1907. The 1907 ordinance gave the sole rights to petroleum 
explorations exclusively to British personnel and companies; quite natural since 
Nigeria was a commonwealth British colony at that time.  
The first well was however, drilled by a German firm – Nigerian Bitumen Company 
in 1908. The well came out dry and the operations were stopped in the light of World 
War I. Interest in pursuing oil activities piqued with the formation of Shell/D’Arcy 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria – an alliance between Shell Petroleum 
Company and British Petroleum. The company gained exclusive rights to the entire 
territory of Nigeria in the form of the Oil Exploration License (OEL). The company 
drilled its first well in 1951, which came out dry. Oil was then struck in 1956 in 
commercial quantities in the Oloibiri region and commercial production begins at 
5,100 barrels of oil per day in 1958.  It also marked the first shipment of crude oil to 
Europe and Nigeria’s entry into the world as an oil-producing nation. By 1957, 
however Shell-BP voluntarily reduced its acreage to 40,000 km2 of Oil Prospecting 
Licence (OPLs), of which it converted 15,000 into Oil Mining Leases (OMLs) in 
1960 and 1962 turning over the remaining to the government. 
To check the petroleum activities of Shell-BP, the Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulations 
of 1952 were put into place, which were later replaced under the 1963 regulations. 
Also, the Oil Pipelines Act of 1956 was passed to ensure transportation of crude over 
long distances. To extract the resource rent, the Petroleum Profit Tax Act was 
established in 1959 with a retroactive effective date of January 1, 1958. In order to 
add momentum to exploration activities and to remove over-dependence on a single 
oil company, the government repelled Section 6(1)a of the Mineral Oils Ordinance of 
1914. 1958, thus marks the entry of IOCs in the Nigerian petroleum industry 
including Mobil Oil, Texaco, Occidental, Agip, the Italian state-owned oil company, 
as well as its French counterpart of Safrap, which is today, Elf. 
Post –Independence 
Nigeria gained independence in 1960 and became a republic on 1 October 1960. 
However, Shell-BP had near monopoly in oil operations until then and enjoyed the 
privilege of gaining the best acreage in the region that continues even today. In 1964, 
Gulf Oil Company made the first offshore discovery. Other discoveries were made in 
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the same decade and Nigeria relied heavily on the expertise of the IOCs to develop its 
petroleum industry, the State earnings limited to the royalty payments by the oil 
companies. As production increased, government revenues from oil started increasing. 
Nigeria distributed revenues among its states based on the principle of derivation 
under which regions generating revenues were entitled to receive a bigger share. Most 
of the oil production was (and continues to be) concentrated in the Igbo-dominated 
South, which piqued the animosity of the northern and the western states dominated 
by the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba. The fight for revenue control lead to two 
military coups in 1966 and ultimately culminated into a civil war in 1967-1970 
affecting production. Although the war did not affect the production capacity, it 
brought the petroleum industry to the limelight of political dynamics in Nigeria 
making it the cornerstone of asserting control over oil by those in power. 
In 1970, 12 concessionaries appeared on the oil concession map thereby leading to the 
upgrading of the Ministry of Mines and Power to the Department of Petroleum 
Resources. The end of the war coincided with the oil price hike of the early 70s. Oil 
windfalls inflated government budgets and spending resulting in policies that would 
prove unsustainable in the face of oil price drops. Nigeria joined the OPEC in 1971 
and echoing the resource nationalisation sentiment, established Nigerian National Oil 
Company (NNOC) to gain control of its petroleum resources. The State accelerated its 
learning curve in the petroleum industry based on experiences of other OPEC 
members. Through the NNOC, the state renegotiated terms with IOCs for equity 
participation and subsequently increased equity participation from 35% in 1971 to 
55% in 1973 and 60% in 1979. It also scrapped traditional agreements and entered 
agreements like Joint Ventures (JVs), Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs), Risk 
Sharing Contracts (RSC) and participation agreements. In order to increase local 
content, the Nigerian Indigenisation Decrees of 1972 and 1979 were passed. NNPC 
was established in 1979 to address issues of corruptions and mismanagement; the 
evolution of the NNPC is described in detail in the following section.  The second oil 
price hike opened more avenues for corruption and wasteful revenue allocation and 
thus the economy suffered with mounting external debts due to the drop in oil prices 
in the 80s. A military regime took over and put in austerity measures hitting the 
Nigerian populace. The most important effect of this was in the Niger Delta where 
sustained demonstrations against the austerity cuts and rising anger over the 
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destruction of the regions through oil operations coupled with poor infrastructure 
growth and alternative avenues for employment have, to this day, made the region 
unstable. In 2005, the Niger Delta crisis led to a drop in production from 2.5 million 
barrels/day in 2005 to 1.6 million barrels/day in July 2009. An amnesty deal by the 
government and the militant forces had helped assuage the situation, however the 
region still presents a significant business risk. We now shift focus to the evolution of 
the Nigerian NOC as it is inextricably linked to development of the petroleum sector 
and lays the foundation for analysis of value creation. 
Evolution of the NNPC 
The NNOC is the precursor NOC of Nigeria created in 1971 to be the overseer of the 
State’s interest in the petroleum industry. It was also important to avoid the State 
being overtly dependent on IOCs. To check oil windfalls and to suggest efficient 
ways of marketing Nigerian crude, a panel was set up in 1975 under the military 
regime of Murtala Muhammed. A separate Ministry of Petroleum Resources was 
created and NNOC was transferred to it in the Obasanjo administration of 1979. 
Following the recommendations of the same panel, NNOC and the Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources merged to form NNPC. The NNPC thus formed, had the power 
and responsibility of the NOC and also acted as a regulator. The ministry under it 
meant that it was also overseer of policy formulation and coordination. It was also 
responsible to refining of crude. NNPC showed the first signs of being a state within a 
state in the late 70s when the NNPC leadership almost ignored the government 
appointed board. 
A new military regime led by Buhari came underway and the Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources was restored. Under the Babangida regime (1985-93), NNPC was 
restructured into five divisions including a Petroleum Inspectorate that improved 
organisational clarity. In 1988, NNPC was commercialised and transformed into a 
holding company with 12 subsidiaries as limited liabilities companies. NAPIMS 
(described later) was created to manage the State’s interest in the industry. 
Additionally, the Petroleum Inspectorate was transferred to the Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources. The Babangida regime also opened the upstream sector to private 
indigenous companies through first public bidding for oil blocks in October 1990. The 
regime also considered privatisation of refineries to resolve domestic fuel scarcity. 
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The same year, Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission 
(OMPADEC) was established to channel resources towards development of the Niger 
Delta. The Abacha regime (1995-98) created the Petroleum Trust Fund for depositing 
and disbursing revenues from increases in refined petroleum product prices, to 
facilitate infrastructure rehabilitation. The regime also scrapped the Department of 
Petroleum Resources. 
The civilian government came to power with the Obasanjo regime after 16 years of 
military rule and set out to make major reforms in the Nigerian petroleum industry. 
The Department of Petroleum was reinstated and natural gas development remained 
the major focus. The gas sector had been neglected over the years and in the absence 
of a market for gas or fiscal incentives for exploiting natural gas, it was flared by the 
IOCs. A mandate set to terminating gas flare was put into practice and Nigeria 
became a significant exporter of natural gas by 2005. December 2004 set the plans in 
motion to create a market for Nigerian natural gas, through the creation of the West 
African Gas Pipeline. The pipeline would supply gas to the neighbouring states of 
Ghana, Benin and Togo. The Nigeria Master Gas Plan was also announced in 2008. 
In April 2000, a 25-member committee was appointed to make recommendations for 
the reform of the Nigerian petroleum sector. The aim of the exercise was to ensure 
maximization of Nigerian economic development by growing reserves and production, 
developing gas market, working to allow the petroleum industry to create new 
industries, improving accountability and providing for the autonomy of the principal 
public sector agencies. The company made several key partnerships in 2005.  
4.1.3 Analysis and Role in Value Creation 
Looking at the manner in which the oil industry evolved in Nigeria and Norway, it is 
not hard to see that their paths have been completely different, that very well puts into 
perspective the design and major forces shaping the institutional features. 
Norway 
Before the discovery of the oil on the NCS, Norway was an independent country 
having competence in managing it’s natural resources such as hydro and fisheries as 
well as had technical capacity through years of experiences in the civil engineering 
and shipbuilding. So when oil was discovered, the State was in no hurry to exploit the 
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resource to pump the revenues into its economy. Rather it was more cautious in the 
way the newfound riches would impact its domestic industry and the social life. It was 
also quick to address that oil activities require special focus and thus created and 
expanded the Petroleum Section with people of high technical calibre early on. 
Norway also benefited from the development of petroleum activities on the UK side. 
UK having more industry experience in oil operations, gave Norway the insights of 
creating terms similar to it’s neighbour not only to learn from it’s experiences but also 
to make the NCS competitive for oil companies to opt into the Norway side. 
Furthermore, it recognised early on that it needs to build local capacity in the sector 
and therefore established and enforced regulations to do so. It also took its time to 
build a sound legislation covering all aspects of the petroleum activities while having 
flexible decrees to allow and encourage petroleum activities.  
Furthermore, the State’s interference in NOC activity was minimal. When the state 
did intervene, it was to help accelerate Statoil’s performance by giving it favourable 
terms than leave it to it’s own devices of learning by doing. The presence of domestic 
competition in the form of technically competent companies like Norsk Hydro meant 
that the State could not only benchmark Statoil’s performance but also leverage 
synergies. Until mid-90s this reflected into Statoil and Norsk Hydro dominating 
production on the NCS (Thurber & Istad, 2010). This simple fact gave the State the 
power to regulate the tempo of petroleum production, which is critical under 
Hotelling’s rule.8 Norway also recognised that it was important to contain Statoil’s 
influence and avoid the phenomenon of it becoming ‘a state within a state’. The 
State’s intervention through transferring Statoil’s financial holdings into SDFIs not 
only helped contain it’s influence but also gave the State more participatory role in 
production licenses which in turn gave it an opportunity to extract more of the 
resource rent. Norway’s entry into the EEA meant that it could no longer give 
favourable terms to Statoil (Al- Kasim, 2006). Also in the light of maturing fields on 
the NCS, it was necessary for the state to prospect for oil internationally. The partial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Hotelling’s theory entails that it is important to regulate the rate of exploitation of petroleum 
resources to benefit from the rents it generates. The producer/resource owner is faced with two choices 
– a. Either to dig the resource, get the economic value of it and invest it into other ventures that provide 
future cash flows or b. Leave the resource in the ground until the time that the future value appreciates 
which makes it financially more valuable. The important thing to consider here is the discount rate of 
the two options. 
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commercialisation and the alliance with BP in the early 90s addressed both these 
issues and helped diversify Statoil’s portfolio. 
Finally, the State was prudent from the onset of protecting the economy from the ill 
effects of oil-revenues and the creation of the Petroleum Fund (subsequently renamed 
the Global Pension Fund Global) not only helped Norway clear it’s external debt but 
also prevented it from the ill effects of the economic slowdown of 2008. 
Nigeria 
Unlike Norway, Nigeria was a commonwealth colony of the British whose economy 
was sustained mostly through cash crops and administered by the British. Regulations 
for petroleum activities were in place in Nigeria even before oil was discovered. 
Moreover, petroleum activities were spiked with geopolitical interests of the British 
and the French in maintaining access to petroleum resources of Nigeria. Petroleum 
activities did bring in huge revenues. Barma et.al (2012) point out that short-term 
increase in rents makes long-term decisions more difficult to sustain and also that in 
this context even technical things can experience a political undercurrent. This is 
evident in the case of Nigeria. The oil price rise of the early 70s coupled with 
increasing production generated massive rents, which in turn inflated government 
budgets. The fiscal policy turned out to be unsustainable when the prices collapsed 
and lead to macroeconomic volatility (Budina et. al, 2006). The fact was aggravated 
by Nigeria’s population growth, which grew by 30 million between 1970 and 1985 
alone. The rents generated also meant that NNOC (NNPC) was at the focal point of 
oil activities and the revenues it brings in, nurtured a system of political patronage 
(Thurber et.al, 2010). Moreover, the Ministry of Petroleum Resources came into 
effect 20 years after commercial petroleum operations were in place, thereby slowly 
giving NNPC more responsibilities than were adequate for an oil company, which led 
to it becoming a state within a state. 
Furthermore, the instability of the governance regimes meant that those in power had 
shorter time horizons and therefore a high discount rate of the future. This in turn 
implied that those in power restructured and reorganised the sector to generate more 
value for themselves even if it meant favouring external entities like IOCs over 
indigenous companies. This ‘Roving Bandit Effect’ has comprised the Hotelling’s 
principle for Nigeria. The restructuring process had the implication that the State lost 
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on building indigenous capacity. As Hosman (2009) indicates, NNPC not only edged 
out local companies by not renewing their licenses or by favouring IOCs, the State 
failed to enforce the employment criteria stipulated within the Indigenization Decrees. 
The absence of domestic capacity and domestic company capable of competing with 
IOCs meant that IOCs are it’s implicit operators even to this day. 
It should be duly noted however, that Nigeria did learn from the OPEC experience by 
bargaining a greater equity share but failure to keep up with the cash calls, demanded 
for it’s share of equity, meant that those type of agreements would not attract investor 
confidence in the future. Also, in the absence of indigenous capacities, this meant that 
Nigeria’s resource wealth risks not being extracted. Moreover, failure to protect and 
develop the Niger Delta has led to instability in the region and has caused disruptions 
to service. Nigeria in the past, thus failed to create value in terms of building local 
capacity, preventing ill-effects of oil revenues on it’s economy and directing the 
course of petroleum activities in it’s territory. However, reforms are underway to 
address these issues. 
4.1.4 Summary 
In summary to section 4.1, it can be said that even with the similarities in terms of 
discovery of oil, the oil industry evolved very differently in Norway and Nigeria. 
Norway benefited from having some industry experience and a mature industry 
supporting the economy before oil was found. This was certainly not the case for 
Nigeria, which was not only overwhelmed with it’s new found riches but it’s 
characteristic political economy saw competition among it’s own people to gain a 
bigger share of the oil pie. Norway has been cautious and prudent with its petroleum 
sector, with policies spanning a longer time horizon. Nigeria on the other hand, 
routinely experienced changing governance, each of which tried to shape the industry 
in a manner most profitable to those in power and thus characterising ‘The Roving 
Bandit Effect’. Norway also was very careful in separating State’s interest and the 
commercial interest of its NOC, which has become an epitome of oil sector 
governance. Nigeria on the other hand, focused more on restructuring it’s NOC to 
serve as a means of siphoning the rents it generated, than on looking at the bigger 
picture and propelling NNPC in competition with the IOCs. Over the same period of 
time, Norway and Nigeria have evolved into very different petroleum - rich countries.  
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4.2 Sector Organisation 
Upstream operations in petroleum industry are not only risky, capital intensive but 
also require technical know-how. In many cases, Host Countries (HCs) lack this 
technical know-how and must rope in the services of the IOCs to extract the resource. 
The objectives are different for the HC and the company commissioned to extract the 
resource. The only overlap in their objectives is to extract the resource so as to derive 
economic value from it. 
On one hand, the oil company is interested in diversifying its risk portfolio across 
petroleum fields in different countries with different geological structures. The other 
value addition for the company to engage in petroleum activities is to accelerate its 
own learning curve and carve a technological niche. The State, on the other hand has 
to not only ensure that the resource generates value for the economy but also to ensure 
that it captures maximum portion of the rent, builds local capacity, enhances other 
industry involvement in processing of petroleum products to name a few (Barma et.al, 
2012). The State manages these objectives by creating an institutional structure to 
manage petroleum operations and interface with the oil companies to eventually help 
extract the resource and derive economic value from it. This is the lens of value 
creation for the HC to provide an institutional and regulatory framework for the oil 
companies to operate in their territory. 
4.2.1 Norway 
Figure 2: Petroleum Sector Organisation: Norway 
 
Source: Author’s own based on data from The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2014 
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The Norwegian petroleum sector organisation is characterised by clear separation of 
roles and responsibilities and has been often cited as ‘The Norwegian Model of Oil 
Sector Governance’. As mentioned earlier, it was the report of 12 June 1970 that laid 
the foundation of the Norwegian Model. It has the following institutional  
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE)  
The MPE is responsible for managing petroleum resources in the NCS. It also ensures 
that petroleum activities carried out are in line with the guidelines set by the 
Parliament and the Government. The MPE also fully owns the state-owned companies 
- Petoro AS, Gassco AS and partially owns Statoil. 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) 
The NPD is the regulator and reports to the MPE. It is the advisory body for the MPE 
and the administrative authority for exploration and production of petroleum deposits. 
It also stipulates regulations and makes decisions under the petroleum activities 
regulations and is the primary authority responsible for collection and analyses of all 
data related to the NCS.  
Statoil 
Statoil represents the commercial arm of the Norwegian Model representing the state 
through active participation in the petroleum industry. The company is partially state 
owned with the State having a 67% ownership interest. It is an international public 
limited liability company, with operations in 33 countries and territories and more 
than 23,000 employees worldwide (Annual Report Statoil, 2013). Statoil engages in 
exploration and production, natural gas supply, R&D, pipelines, decommissioning. 
70% of the company’s oil and gas production is from Norway. 
Petoro AS 
The fully owned state company manages the State Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) on 
behalf of the state. 
Gassco AS 
The fully owned state company manages the transportation of gas in the NCS and is 
the operator for Gassled. 
The Ministry Of Labour 
The Ministry of Labour oversees the regulation, supervision of the working 
environment, along with the safety and emergency preparedness with respect to 
petroleum activities. 
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The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) 
The PSA has the responsibility for technical and operational safety, also including 
emergency preparedness and working environment in the petroleum activities. 
The Ministry Of Finance 
The Ministry of Finance is responsible for collecting taxes and fees such as the 
corporate tax, special tax, CO2 tax and NOx tax, from the petroleum activities, on 
behalf of the state. 
The Petroleum Tax Office 
The Petroleum Tax Office lies within the Norwegian Tax Administration, which in 
turn reports to the Ministry of Finance. It is responsible for ensuring correct levying 
and payment of taxes and fees adopted by the political authorities. 
The Directorate of Customs and Excise 
The Directorate of Customs and Excise is responsible for ensuring correct levying and 
payment of the NOx tax. 
Government Pension Fund - Global 
The Ministry of Finance manages the Government Pension Fund – Global the 
operative management responsibility of which has been delegated to the Norges Bank. 
The Ministry Of Fisheries And Coastal Affairs 
The Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs ensures sound emergency preparedness 
against acute pollution in Norwegian waters. 
The Norwegian Coastal Administration 
The Norwegian Coastal Administration ensures the State’s oil spill preparedness. 
The Ministry Of The Environment 
The Ministry of the Environment is responsible for managing environmental 
protection and the external environment in Norway. 
The Climate and Pollution Agency 
The Climate and Pollution Agency is responsible for following up the Pollution 
Control Act while providing advice and basic technical materials to the Ministry of 
the Environment.   
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4.2.2 Nigeria 
The information for the Nigerian oil sector organisation is primarily sourced from the 
audit report of the Nigerian Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative (Sada, Idris 
& Co, 2013). 
Figure 3: Petroleum Sector Organisation: Nigeria 
Source: Author’s own based on data from Federal Republic of Nigeria9 
Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources (FMPR) 
The FMPR is responsible for initiating policies for the oil and gas sector and 
supervises the implementation of approved policies. It also has a lot of agencies and 
parastatals under it, which ensure the execution of the approved policies for the sector.  
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
The NNPC is Nigeria’s NOC representing the State in the petroleum activities. It is 
wholly owned by the state and is a fully vertically integrated oil company and it’s 
functions can be categorized as follows (Thurber et al.,2010): 
• A sector manager and quasi regulator through NAPIMS (described below) 
• Buyer and seller of oil and refined petroleum products 
• Plays operational role in upstream, downstream and gas transport activities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9Federal Republic of Nigeria, Government. Available at http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-06-
51/executive-branch. Last Accessed May 31, 2014 
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• Service provider to the Nigerian oil sector. 
The NNPC is a holding company with 11 fully owned subsidiaries and two partially 
owned subsidiaries or Corporate Business Units (Nwokeji, 2007). Thurber et al. 
(2010) categories them as follows: 
Table 1: NNPC subsidiaries by function 
Interface with IOCs 
National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS) 
Crude Oil Buyers and Sellers 
Crude Oil Marketing Division (COMD) 
Pipelines and Products Marketing Company (PPMC) 
Hydrocarbon Services Nigeria (HYSON): Marketing JV with Vitol 
Operational (Upstream and Natural Gas) 
Nigeria Petroleum Development Company (NPDC): E&P 
Nigerian Gas Company (NGC): Natural gas pipeline operation 
Operational (Downstream) 
Nigerian LNG (NLNG): LNG facility operation, 49% NNPC-owned 
Warri Refining & Petrochemical Company (WRPC) 
Port Harcourt Refining Company (PHRC) 
Kaduna Refining & Petrochemical Company (KRPC) 
Eleme Petrochemicals Company Limited (EPCL) 
Services 
National Engineering & Technical Company (NETCO): Engineering design 
Integrated Data Services Limited (IDSL): Seismic data processing 
Source: Thurber et. al (2010) 
National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS)  
As mentioned above, NAPIMS is one of the 11 fully owned subsidiaries of NNPC 
and operates in the upstream sector of the petroleum industry. It interfaces with the 
IOCs by acting as a government agent while entering in PSCs while being the 
approver for yearly budgets for IOC led JVs (Thurber et al., 2010).  
Additionally, it also engages in frontier exploration services in basins where IOCs are 
reluctant to venture into (Sada, Idris & Co, 2013).  
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
The DPR is aligned under the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, and is responsible for 
supervision of all petroleum industry operations carried out under licenses and leases 
in Nigeria.  It is responsible for processing all applications for licenses, monitoring 
the timeliness of operations along the value chain of petroleum activities. 
Additionally, it ensures the payments of all rents and royalties accruing to the State. 
Furthermore, it maintains records of operations of the petroleum industry related to 
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petroleum reserves, technical viability of production and exports of crude oil, gas and 
condensates, licenses and leases.  
The Petroleum Training Institute (PTI)  
The PTI is a parastatal of the Ministry responsible for human capacity building for 
petroleum sector. 
The Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) 
The PTDF is a parastatal of the Ministry responsible for initiating and coordinating 
programs for development of petroleum technology. 
The Petroleum Equalization Fund (PEF) 
The PTDF is a parastatal of the Ministry to oversees petroleum-bridging activities.  
The Petroleum Products Pricing and Regulatory Agency (PPRA)  
The PPRA is a Government agency that fixes the benchmark prices of petroleum 
products. It is also responsible for regulating and monitoring the transportation and 
distribution of petroleum products in Nigeria.  
The Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board 
It is an agency under the FMPR established to regulate and monitor the 
implementation of indigenous participation in all activities of the petroleum industry.  
Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) 
The FIRS is responsible for collection of taxes and royalties due to the State. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
The CBN holds the State’s accounts for petroleum revenues and is an advisory for the 
state in the financial matter. 
Office of the Accountant General of the Federation (OAGF) 
The OAGF is the chief accounting officer, responsible for the receipts and payments 
of the Government; supervision of the accounts of Federal Ministries and Extra-
Ministerial Departments; maintenance and operation of the accounts of the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund and other public funds; and maintains and operates the 
Federation accounts.  
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 
The NDDC is the body solely responsible for the development of the neglected and 
disputed Niger Delta region that has the maximum petroleum reserves in the country. 
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Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) 
The TETFund is an intervention agency with the objective of improving the quality of 
Education in Nigeria. The FIRS assesses and collects the 2% Education Tax imposed 
on the assessable profit of all registered companies in Nigeria and hands it to the 
TETFund which later disburses the amounts to educational institutions at Federal, 
State Government levels while overseeing their operations. 
Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) 
The RMAFC was created to ensure a fair and equitable share of revenues from the 
State’s fiscal policy to its constituent states. 
4.2.3 Analysis and Role in Value Creation 
Norway’s petroleum sector organisation is known as the ‘Norwegian Model’ and is 
often cited as a role model for good governance of the petroleum sector. The 
characteristic of the Norwegian Model is the clear separation of functions between the 
Ministry overseeing the petroleum activities to ensure that they are aligned with 
broader government objectives, the Directorate playing the regulator and Statoil 
representing the commercial interests of the State in petroleum activities. It introduces 
clarity of roles and avoids conflicting interests. While Nigeria’s governance structure 
also shows a clear distinction between the Ministry, the Directorate and the NOC- 
NNPC, the NNPC Act of 1977	   (NEITI, 2010) also vests regulatory responsibilities 
onto NNPC. This introduces conflict of interests. 
The most conspicuous thing about the sector organisation of the two countries is the 
simplicity of the Norwegian Model and the complexity of the Nigerian Model. The 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate itself is tasked with four main responsibilities that 
relate back to regulation but its Nigerian counterpart is also responsible for collecting 
payments accruing to the government from petroleum activities whereas, the OAGF 
already exists to collect all revenues due to the government. This indicates a slight 
duplication of roles. Furthermore, the DPR of Nigeria is also responsible for 
managing agencies tasked with building indigenous capacity and improving local 
content. Norway, manages these roles through its NOC.  
4.2.3.1 Technical Capacity 
Barma et al. (2012) and Thurber et.al (2010) highlight the importance of technical 
capacity of governmental agencies tasked with regulating and monitoring the 
	   35	  
petroleum sector. Technical capacity to administer functions is crucial in any sector 
and it is no surprise that a sector’s performance hinges on it, as it is the most 
important tool for value creation. As has been noted above, Norway has been 
diligently building technical capacity in the petroleum sector, both in administrative 
sense and also on the technological front, while Nigeria has mostly failed to do so. 
Thurber et.al (2010) point that the FIRS and the DPR lack capacity for tax and royalty 
collection, which results in under collection of revenues. Nwokeji (2007) also states 
that duplication of functions between the NNPC and the DPR not only creates 
inefficiencies, but also puts pressure on the limited pool of talent when the same 
functions are to be performed in two different agencies. The same can be observed for 
DPRs role in revenue collection and that of the OAGF. 
Thurber et.al (2011) analyses if separation of functions alone is necessary for a high 
performing petroleum sector and they conclude that even developing countries like 
Angola, that have no clear separation of roles have an efficient well performing 
petroleum sector. The author recommends that for countries like Nigeria who have a 
low institutional capacity, the focus should first be on developing technical and 
institutional capacity.  
4.2.3.2 Legal and Regulatory Framework 
Barma et al. (2012) point out that legal and regulatory framework is one of the key 
technical issues in sector organisation. The authors state that an enforceable, 
transparent, comprehensive regulatory framework provides a stable and predictable 
policy environment thereby improving investor confidence. For the framework to be 
enforceable, the requisite technical capacity must be present.  
Governance is an important factor to gauge institutional efficacy. In the context of the 
State and the petroleum industry, we try to analyse how Norway and Nigeria fare on 
the World Bank Governance Indicators. The chart below, presents Norway and 
Nigeria’s percentile ranking for the year 2012 for each of the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators.  
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Table 2: Governance Indicators 2012 
Indicator Year Percentile 
Ranking 
Norway Nigeria 
Voice and Accountability 2012 100 27.5 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism 2012 93.8 3.3 
Government Effectiveness 2012 98.1 15.8 
Regulatory Quality 2012 91.9 25.5 
Rule of Law 2012 100 10.4 
Control of Corruption 2012 98.6 11.0 
Source: Author’s own based on data from Worldwide Governance Indicators (The World Bank Group) 
As can be observed, Nigeria fares poorly and Norway rather excellently on the 
governance indicators. Below, we analyse each in greater detail.  
Voice and Accountability 
Historic factors, as noted in the previous section do influence the current governance 
situation, however the imposition of confidentiality clauses in Nigeria’s laws and 
regulations in the petroleum sector do impose barriers on transparency (NEITI, 2010). 
Al-Kasim (2006) mentions the meticulous reporting requirements demanded by 
Norway. The information thus, generated not only helps foster transparency but also 
gives the opportunity to make informed decisions and acts as a learning repository for 
future endeavours.  
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism 
The post-independence history of Nigeria, gives a clear idea of governance power 
shifting between the military regimes and civilian governments. Political stability 
affects the institutional framework and correspondingly the regulatory policies as can 
be concluded looking at Nigeria’s example. It is an important factor in the petroleum 
industry for two reasons: 
• Upstream petroleum activities are risky, capital intensive; require resource 
mobilisation and span for decades10. This makes it necessary for oil companies 
to have stable policies for the longer run as they would otherwise incur sunk 
costs or losses and increase in risk level. For the State, lower predictability of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The average lifecycle of an oil field from exploration to decommissioning is 25 years. 
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policies perceived by the investor (IOCs) would lower their confidence in the 
State and demand higher risk premium (Barma et. al, 2012). This has the 
potential to affect future investments in the sector. 
• Lack of confidence in time horizons perceived by the companies can compel 
them to adopt short-term production approach which increases the rate of 
depletion of the resource (Barma et. al, 2012). This could be in conflict to the 
State’s goal of tempo regulation. 
Absence of violence and terrorism is key to conducting business. It becomes even 
more crucial in the petroleum industry where companies incur sunk costs if their 
ability to produce is disrupted. For the oil company, it presents enormous risk not 
only to its facilities but also to its human capital. It also increases the break-even time 
for the company and discourages future alliances with the State. Moreover, damage to 
personnel could also increase the chances of the companies facing reputational risk. 
The State then bears the risk of making the sector unattractive for the oil companies 
and risks letting the resource stay in the ground.  
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law 
These factors go hand in hand and are influenced by the technical capacity to 
administer effective administration and discharge of duties. Sector organisation and 
separation of functions is important as has been noted earlier and Norway scores well 
because its sector organisation has become an anecdotal example of governance. In 
Nigeria however, reforms and institutional building efforts have failed for two 
primary reasons as pointed by Thurber et.al (2010) 
• President being the key figure in Nigerian government sits at the nexus of the 
State, NNPC and the IOCs and thereby also sits at the top of the patronage 
pyramid. This position gives the president immense power to appoint people 
in important and lucrative positions while curtailing his ability to alter the 
governance parameters as they sustain the patronage ecosystem, he himself 
used to get to top. 
• The Roving Bandit: Lack of will to transform resulting from short-sightedness. 
A way to increase the technical capacity in governance agencies is to attract superior 
talent by setting out competitive terms. The NPD leadership did just that by obtaining 
a generous and competitive salary structure for NPD to develop it’s technical capacity 
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(Thurber et.al, 2011). No such effort seems apparent by the DPR, which has 
perpetually relied on NNPC for personnel in their arranged marriage (Nwokeji, 2007). 
Control of Corruption 
Transparency in operations, accurate reporting and accounting, complete laws and 
regulations goes a long way in controlling corruption.  
Table 3: Corruption Perception Index comparison 2004 - 2013 
Year Country rank 
Nigeria Norway 
2013 144 5 
2012 139 7 
2011 143 6 
2010 134 10 
2009 130 11 
2008 121 14 
2007 147 9 
2006 142 8 
2005 152 8 
2004 144 8 
Source: Author’s own based on Data from Corruption Perception Index 
Observing the data from the Corruption Perception Index, it can be noted that while 
Norway has made significant efforts in improving its corruption perception rank, 
Nigeria seems to be stuck in the most corrupt countries category. Almost every study 
focusing on Nigeria addresses the issues of corruption. Thurber et.al (2010) and 
Nwokeji (2007) highlight the fact that corruption is ubiquitous in the oil industry and 
it forms a basis of a patronage system. Besides patronage, corruption also stems from 
factors such as lack of clarity, presence of loopholes, red tapesim and number of 
middlemen to name a few. Corruption increases operating costs for the IOCs, which 
in most cases cannot be officially reported or categorised under accounting standards. 
For the State, corruption causes loss of credibility and in the longer run; the value 
created is grabbed by the chain keepers rather than dispensing to the society. 
4.2.3.3 Role of the NOC 
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It is essential to address the role of NOC, as a critical part of the institutional 
framework, in value creation. It is through the NOC that the State formally 
participates in the activities of the petroleum sector on level grounds with the IOCs.  
Boscheck (2007) highlights the fact that NOC cannot be treated as black boxes as 
they not only represent the State’s political and economic interests in petroleum 
operations, but also control about 90% of global petroleum reserves. NOCs, at the 
time of inception, lack the technical capacity and capital available at the disposal of 
the IOCs. It is then upon the State and the NOC to make the NOC as competitive as 
the IOCs.  
Statoil has succeeded exceedingly at carving a niche for itself by being a forerunner in 
technological innovations in the NCS and now in the challenging conditions of the 
Barrents Sea. It has also successfully secured access to funding through partial 
privatisation and forming strategic alliance with BP allowing it to explore for oil in 34 
countries creating more value than a traditional NOC.  
The role of NNPC is more crucial in the Nigerian petroleum industry as it not only 
has to manage the State’s interest in petroleum activities but also ensure it regulates 
the tempo of the activities while honouring it’s OPEC production allocations. The 
national daily crude production capacity is currently 2.5million b/d (NNPC, 2014) 
while the OPEC production allowance for Nigeria has ranged between 1.3 million b/d 
– 2.3 million b/d between 1982 and 2006 (OPEC, 2007). It can also be fairly 
concluded that NNPC has not been extremely instrumental in leveraging its position 
to build domestic capacity. Additionally, the nature of financial flows between NNPC 
and the State entails that it has no financial autonomy, which seriously cripples its 
ambitions of growth (Thurber et. al, 2010). 
4.2.4 Summary 
In summary of section 4.2, it can be noted that Norway’s petroleum sector 
organisation is characterised by clear separation of roles with an extremely successful 
NOC. In Nigeria’s case, even if sector organisation shows a clear separation of roles 
on the surface, the functional dynamics are littered with duplication of functions, 
weak governance and low technical capacity. The governance indicators indicate that 
Norway’s better score makes its petroleum sector more attractive to IOCs than 
Nigeria’s, which creates conditions apt to exploit natural resources for value creation.  
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4.3 Lifecycle of petroleum operations 	  
Petroleum activities are complex and require a great deal of technical know-how. 
Additionally, since it cannot be confirmed with 100% accuracy whether a given area 
will contain oil that can be exploited in commercial quantities, the upstream sector is 
extremely risky and capital intensive. Due to these reasons, the HC ropes in the 
services of the IOC as they are better equipped to proceed with upstream operations 
and also since their diversified portfolio puts them in a better position to manage risks. 
However, giving the control entirely to IOCs is not favourable to HCs, which is why 
the HCs enter into different model agreements with the IOCs. The type of model 
agreement dictates the terms of HC – IOC engagements. Presented below are some of 
the most common model agreements that are used in Norway and Nigeria.  
Joint Venture Agreements 
Under the JV agreements, the State via its NOC contributes to upstream projects 
based on equity participation. The partnership can be between more than two 
participants with one participant being designated as the operator. The production and 
risks are also shared proportionately among equity participants.  
Production Sharing Contracts 
The PSC design entails that the HC appoints a competent IOC as a contractor to 
develop petroleum activities in a certain region. The IOC assumes all the risks in the 
project and is solely responsible for developing the project. The production, if any, 
belongs to the HC. The production consists of three parts: 
‘Royalty Oil’: Representing payment of royalty to the HC. 
‘Cost Oil’: The share of oil after the ‘Royalty Oil’ given to the IOC to recover it’s 
operating costs. In Nigeria, this is capped to 40% per annum; any additional costs can 
be carried forward. 
‘Profit Oil’: The profit oil is shared between the IOC and the HC on the split agreed 
upon in the PSA. IOC share of the profit oil decreases as production increases. 
Over and above, the IOC is also liable to pay income tax on its net profits from the 
PSC. As a HC therefore, the PSCs provide resource rent in terms of ‘Royalty oil’, 
‘Profit Oil’ and the tax paid by the IOC.  
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Service Contract 
The service contract is similar to the PSC however; the IOC is remunerated in cash 
for its services rather than in crude oil.  
Marginal Fields/ Sole Risks 
As fields mature and production drops, it is no longer profitable for the big IOCs to 
exploit these fields rather than focusing on producing from other “juicy” fields in their 
portfolio. Such fields are then sold to smaller operators. This is a model agreement 
used in Nigeria and the independent operators are indigenous companies. 
The model agreements are an important way to understand how the HC and the IOC 
interact with each other through the entire lifecycle of petroleum operations, which is 
what is illustrated in the following part. Of the various model agreements stated above, 
only JVs are common to both countries, while the rest are used only in Nigeria. 
4.3.1 Norway 
Figure 4: Lifecycle of petroleum operations: Norway 
Source: Author’s own based on data from The Act 29 November 1996 No. 7211 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The Act 29 November 1996 No. 72, The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. Available at 
http://www.npd.no/en/Regulations/Regulations/Petroleum-activities/. Last Accessed May 31, 2014 
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The Act 29 November 1996 No. 72 relating to petroleum activities, gives the lifecycle 
of petroleum operations in Norway as is summarised below. 
Before an area is opened for petroleum activities, an impact assessment is carried to 
gauge the economic, social and environmental impacts of the said petroleum activities 
as well as its impacts on other industries in the particular and neighbouring regions. 
Following the assessment, the government makes public announcements for blocks 
that would be accepting production licenses. Applicants then apply individually or in 
groups and the licensing is governed by the licensing policy. The MPE awards 
production licenses to the applicants while designating an operator responsible to 
oversee the operational activities that are authorised by the license. 
A Production license grants companies the exclusive right to survey, explore for, drill 
and produce petroleum in the acreage granted. The licensees also own the petroleum 
produced. The production license is valid for 10 years during which the licensee 
carries out exploration work by submitting a work commitment program. After the 
commitment has been fulfilled the licensee can either relinquish the license or 
continue to the next phase of developing the resource. 
The development of the field continues if the discovery is found to be commercially 
viable. The licensee submits a Plan for Development and Operation to the MPE for 
approval. The plan must contain an impact assessment of the economic, social and 
environmental impacts of the proposed petroleum activities. Post approval, the 
licensee is solely responsible for the development of the field. The petroleum 
produced is subject to taxation as described in Section 5. 
Two to five years before the expiry of the production license or cessation of operation, 
the licensee is required to submit a decommissioning plan to the Ministry. The plan 
must consist of assessment of impact from disposal activities and the proposed plan to 
carry out the dismantling of facility and cessation of activities. 
4.3.2 Nigeria 
 
Unlike Norway, Nigeria does not have one streamlined process that can snuggly fit 
into the framework of describing the entire lifecycle of petroleum production. Nigeria 
has different types of model agreements for engaging in upstream activities. These are 
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the JVs, the PSCs, Service Contracts and Marginal Field /Sole Risk Operators. As 
have been described above. 
Figure 5: Lifecycle of petroleum operations under JV: Nigeria 
Source: Author’s own based on Astegbua (1999) 
The lifecycle for petroleum operation under the traditional leases system is based on 
the Petroleum Act of 1969. Under this Act, a company wishing to undertake 
petroleum operations in Nigeria must be incorporated in Nigeria. The first step is to 
acquire an Oil Exploration Licence (OEL). The OEL is granted by the Minister of the 
Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources in Nigeria and entitles the owner to carry 
out aerial, surface and geological surveys and drilling no greater than 91.44 meters in 
an area, no greater than 12,950 km2. The license terminates on 31st December in the 
year of application with a possibility to extend for another year provided certain 
criteria is fulfilled. Following the OEL, the applicant can apply for an Oil Prospecting 
License (OPL) through the same application process. The Minister again has the 
discretion to grant the license and set the duration of which cannot exceed 5 years 
including renewals. The OPL gives the owner the sole right to explore and prospect 
for oil in the area designated. If oil is found in commercial quantities, the applicant 
must relinquish the OPL and apply for an OML. The Minister again has the discretion 
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to award the OML, which gives the owner the right to carry away and dispose off the 
petroleum found in the area granted. The JV agreement is entered between NNPC and 
the oil company when the OML is granted and the terms of the agreement are 
specified in the Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) and in the OML (Nlerum, 2010). 
The participants contribute equity and share risk as per the participation agreement 
and share the production on the same basis. 
4.3.3 Analysis and Role in Value Creation 
 
The primary observation that can be made by looking at the lifecycle of petroleum 
operations is again the simplicity and lucidity in the Norwegian way as compared to 
the Nigerian way.  
The Norwegian illustration considers the entire lifecycle of the petroleum operations 
while the Nigerian seems a bit truncated and staccato. Also there is only one single 
streamlined process for Norway whereas the process is different for Nigeria based on 
the fiscal regime under which the upstream activities take place. In Norway’s case, 
every phase is carefully thought of, streamlined and transparent, which helps assess 
the risk and reward in each stage. For instance, the preliminary impact assessment 
ensures that petroleum operations do not disrupt or harm the economic, social and 
environmental ecosystems of the acreage under consideration. Moving to the next 
phase, the State does not carry the financial risk of failed explorations. Next, the State 
participates through SDFI to oversee and regulate the tempo of the operations. When 
production begins in the next stage, the State benefits from the resource rent 
generated through its fiscal and non-fiscal instruments (described in more detail in the 
next section). Finally, after the field has been exploited, the State ensures that proper 
dismantling operations are effectuated such as not to disrupt or harm the economic, 
social and environmental ecosystems. 
For Nigeria on the other hand, the complex arrangement adds more burden to the 
already starved technical capacity and presents more challenges to value creation. 
However as will be noted in the next section, Nigeria did have sound reasons to 
engage and leverage the different types of model agreements in it’s pursuit for 
creating more value and maximising the resource rent. It is also noteworthy, that 
presently it does not seem that Nigeria has strict plans for decommissioning and 
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dismantling of petroleum fields. The Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act of 2007, 
which is a principle for the legal and regulatory frameworks for the extractives 
industries, does indicate a weakness for not having any provision for restoration and 
reversibility of mining lands. Furthermore, it has still no provisions for HSE of miners 
and employees and even deprives host community involvement (NEITI, 2010). The 
exact details of how the lifecycle of petroleum operations takes place for the various 
regimes however could not be found in the public domain. It is therefore unfair to 
completely dismiss the possibility of value creation for Nigeria when looking at the 
lifecycle of petroleum operations. 
4.3.4 Summary 	  
In summary of section 4.3, it can be noted that different types of model agreements 
exist between the HC and the IOC throughout the lifecycle of petroleum activities. 
The model agreements provide a lens for understanding how the HC and the IOC 
interact with each other to derive more value from the petroleum activities. The 
common types of agreements are the JVs, the PSCs, the Service Contract and the 
Marginal Fields/ Sole Risk operators.  
Norwegian petroleum lifecycle is characterised by the JVs and spawns over every 
detail of the petroleum activity while considering the impact of the activities on the 
social, economic and environmental aspects thereby containing the social and 
environmental costs. There is little data available on how Nigeria proceeds with its 
petroleum activities and it is therefore not completely possible to assess the extent of 
value creation. It is however clear that presently Nigeria has no strict regulations or 
plans in place to oversee the decommissioning aspects of petroleum activities. 
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4.4 Conclusion – Role of Institutional Frameworks in Value Creation 
An institutional setup is essential to facilitate macroeconomic activities in a specific 
framework, which in turn creates value for the State. In the specific context of the 
petroleum industry, the role of institutional frameworks matter because of the high 
risk of the industry and the high economic rents it generates. Petroleum industry is 
also unique because of the social and environmental costs it imposes. These costs 
have to be balanced carefully while trying to derive value from the resource. Also, 
since extracting petroleum resource from the ground requires complex technical 
know-how, in most cases, the services of an incumbent IOC has to be sought by the 
State. 
Value creation in the petroleum industry through a good institutional design therefore 
relies on the following factors: 
• Extracting the resource from the ground and converting the non-renewable 
resource into a renewable monetary resource. 
• Providing a lucid and stimulating business environment to attract the IOCs to 
carry out petroleum activities on the State’s behalf. 
• Engaging with the IOC to climb up on the learning curve of performing 
petroleum activities. 
• Monitoring the activities of the IOCs to ensure that they are inline with the 
overall objectives of the State for deriving value from the petroleum resource. 
• Engage other aspects of the economy in the petroleum sector so as to spread 
the value creation to other sectors. 
• Mitigate social and environmental risks and minimise social costs. 
Section 4 started off by presenting a brief history of the oil industry in Norway and 
Nigeria with a special focus on the evolution of the their respective NOCs – Statoil 
and NNPC. Later, the sector organisation was presented and the analytic framework 
built on the Governance Indicators by the World Bank. The final part of the section 
focused on value creation through the lifecycle of petroleum activities in Norway and 
Nigeria. Through each of these parts, core factors responsible for creating value were 
discussed along with their impacts. 
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Through the history of oil industry in Norway, it is evident that Norway leveraged its 
previous natural resource management experience to manage its petroleum sector. 
Moreover, Norway’s approach towards exploiting its reserves was timely, prudent 
and cautionary. This helped Norway create a stimulating environment to encourage 
IOCs to participate in Norway’s petroleum activities. Moreover, through continuous 
engagement of the State in petroleum activities, it was not only able to learn to 
manage the petroleum activities independently but also carved itself a niche in the 
form of Statoil, the domestic oil company champion. Norway’s clear separation of 
functions through a partially privatised NOC not only provides clarity in functions but 
also helps create more value for the State through Statoil’s activities abroad. 
Moreover, the meticulous detail of monitoring the lifecycle of petroleum activities 
creates a steady and lucid framework for the IOCs to follow and also creates value on 
the economic, social and environmental fronts. 
Nigeria’s oil industry history is coloured with elements of political economy. Being a 
British colony producing cash crops, meant that Nigeria (Nigerians) had no technical 
know-how of managing natural resources as complex as in the extractives industry. 
Moreover, a closer examination of the oil industry evolution brings to light the fact 
that the petroleum laws and regulations created pre-independence were such that it 
favoured Shell-BP more than the Nigerian State. It is but natural, for that is the 
principle of exploiting a colony for its resources. Nigeria has also been less lucky with 
the chronology of key events. The independence coincided with record high oil prices 
and poor enterprise capacity to manage natural resources. The absence of important 
domestic industries also meant that Nigeria’s approach towards exploiting its resource 
was not as cautionary as Norway. High revenues in a short time managed by a yet 
juvenile administration meant unsustainable fiscal policies for public spending, which 
eventually culminated into political instability, animosity within the masses over the 
right of resource rent and the eventual struggle to control the NNPC as an important 
instrument in gaining financial gains for those in power. 
All these factors have characterised the Nigerian petroleum industry as being 
politically dynamic with a lack of clarity that is intentionally maintained to derive 
profits for the chain keepers. Nevertheless, joining the OPEC accelerated Nigeria’s 
ascent on bargaining more favourable terms for itself from the IOCs. It was also quick 
to enter in different model agreements to keep the pace of petroleum activities and 
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thereby derive more value from it. So while Nigeria has managed to eventually create 
an institutional framework to manage petroleum activities, it has yet to develop 
technical capacity to manage it independently and still relies heavily on expertise of 
the IOC to create value in its petroleum sector. Also the lack of another important 
domestic industry means that the petroleum industry is still at the heart of the 
Nigerian economy. 
Returning back to factors of the institutional design that create value in the petroleum 
sector, it can be concluded that: 
Table 4: Summary of factors creating value in Institutional frameworks 
Factors creating value Norway Nigeria 
Extract resource to derive 
monetary value 
Succeeded Succeeded but corruption 
negates some value 
Provide a lucid and stimulating 
business environment for IOC 
activity 
Succeeded Partially succeeded. 
Duplication of functions 
and non-separation of roles 
still negates some value 
Engage with IOC to ascent on 
learning curve 
Succeeded Failed.  
Monitor IOC activity inline with 
State’s objectives 
Succeeded Failed. State’s objectives 
are coloured by the 
patronage network 
Engage and protect other industries Succeeded Failed 
Mitigate social and environmental 
risks and minimise social costs 
Succeeded Failed miserably. See 
Section 6 for details 
 
Additionally, the above average rating on the World Governance Indicators and 
Corruption Perception Index makes Norway a more favourable business location than 
Nigeria, who has consistently performed poorly on the same indicators. 
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5 Role of Fiscal Framework in Value Creation 
 
While the institutional structure and sector organisation create value in attracting the 
IOCs to explore for, prospect and produce petroleum, the fiscal frameworks are 
essential to capture the resource rent once the resource has been extracted. It is the 
State’s objective to maximise this resource rent and derive economic value from it. 
The design of the fiscal framework is important to understand, as it should capture the 
bulk of the resource rent while ensuring that the required investment associated with 
the capital-intensive petroleum operations are not affected. There are various fiscal 
and non-fiscal instruments a State can employ to capture the resource rent.  
This section is organised as follows. The first part presents the different non-fiscal 
instruments that Norway and Nigeria employ to capture the resource rent. The second 
part, briefly describes the fiscal instruments that the States employ additionally, to 
capture the resource rent. 
Each part presents the factors for Norway and Nigeria separately. Each part then 
concludes with an analysis of the factors governing the choice of such instruments in 
the light of earlier discussions and throws light on how these create value for Norway 
and Nigeria. 
Finally, the section concludes with a summary and implications to value creation from 
the main points presented in this section. 
5.1 Non-Fiscal Instruments - Model Agreements 
 
Once the HC and the IOC have decided to work together on upstream petroleum 
operations, they enter into binding contracts with each other. As described in section 
4.3, these are called Model Agreements and describe the manner in which the State 
and the IOC engage in upstream oil activities. The main aim of these agreements is to 
mitigate, or share the Exploration and Production (E&P) costs and risks between them 
(Al-Atar & Alomair, 2005). The different types of model agreements prescribe and 
dictate the nature of ownership and IOC control of the resource. Two factors are 
important when designing the model agreements.  
The quality of the reserves – Petroleum reserves can be currently thought to consist 
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of crude oil and natural gas. While natural gas has no quality variations, crude oil has 
two major quality measures – the API gravity and the sulphur content12 that affect the 
price it fetches in the oil markets. Crude oils that have a higher API gravity (lighter) 
and have low sulphur content (sweeter) fetch a higher price.  
Norway produces Brent crude oil from the North Sea, which is sweet and light and 
also sets the benchmark for oil prices in the oil markets. Nigeria produces various 
classes of oils13 most of which are light and sweet (NNPC, 2014).  
E&P costs – As has been noted in the previous section, E&P activities are risky and 
capital intensive. High E&P costs are a result of maturing fields that require most 
sophisticated techniques like the Enhanced Oil Recovery and carrying out E&P 
operations in deep offshore. In countries with low E&P costs, the State seeks more 
control over operation and production of the resource (Al-Atar & Alomair, 2005).  
Table 5: E&P costs per barrel of production: Norway and Nigeria14 
Country Exploration Cost Production Cost Total 
Norway (North Sea) $7.50 $3.00 $10.50 
Nigeria $3.00 $2.25 $5.25 
Source: Author’s own based on data from Al-Atar & Alomair, 2005 
The above costs per barrel categorise Nigeria as a medium-cost country and Norway 
as a high-cost country. Consequently, the model agreements that exist in these two 
countries are a function of costs. Presented in the following sections are the non-fiscal 
instruments that Norway and Nigeria employ in upstream activities. 
5.1.1 Norway 
Dividends from Statoil 
The State is the majority shareholder with 67% shares in Statoil and therefore receives 
dividends from Statoil’s operations in Norway and abroad. 
States Direct Financial Interest  (SDFI) 
The SDFI is a type of JV. The SDFI is what the name suggests; the state owns a share, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The lighter the oil is the less dense and viscous it is. Viscosity has implications for extraction as 
viscous oil sticks to the rocks and it more difficult to extract and refine which increases costs. Oil with 
low sulphur content reduces SOx emissions. 
13 Antan Blend, Bonny Light, Bonny Medium, Brass Blend, Escravos Light, Forcados Blend, IMA, 
Odudu Blend, Pennington Light, Qua-Iboe Light and Ukpokiti 
14 The values are in 2005 US dollars. 
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which varies from field to field, in the oil and gas fields, pipelines and onshore 
facilities through the licensing process. The state finances the investment for these 
projects based on its share while earning a corresponding portion of revenue from the 
petroleum operations. 
5.1.2 Nigeria 
JVs 
Nigeria, via NNPC participates in JVs with IOCs. As mentioned earlier, the JV 
operates under the terms agreed in the Operating Agreement (JOA) with the NNPC 
and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Federal Government. NNPC 
operates in seven joint ventures and the details of the equity participation are as 
follows: 
Table 6: Joint Venture participants: Nigeria 
  Partners Equity Interest  Operator No. of OMLs 
 1 Shell  
Agip  
Elf  
NNPC  
30%  
5%  
10%  
55%  
Shell 58 
2 Mobil  
NNPC  
40%  
60%  
Mobil 4  
3 Chevron  
NNPC  
40%  
60%  
Chevron  16 
4 Agip  
Philips  
NNPC  
20%  
20%  
60%  
Agip N/A 
5 Elf  
NNPC  
40%  
60%  
Elf 14 
6 Texaco  
Chevron  
NNPC  
20%  
20%  
60%  
Texaco 6 
 7 Pan Ocean  
NNPC  
40%  
60%  
Pan Ocean 1 
Source: Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission 
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Production Sharing Contracts 
The share of PSCs is increasing in Nigeria since 2002. It was devised to develop 
frontier areas in the deep offshore. As these regions bear more risk, the royalty 
payment is adjusted on a sliding scale as was described in the previous section. 
Additionally, the PPT is reduced to 50% instead of 85% acknowledging the high risk 
of the operations. There were nine operators under the PSC in Nigeria between 2009 -
2011 (Sada, Idris & Co, 2013). 
Service Contract 
Currently, Nigeria only has one Service Contract with Agip Energy & Natural 
Resources Ltd. (Sada, Idris & Co, 2013). 
Marginal Fields/ Sole Risk Operators 
Currently, Nigeria has 23 operators managing the marginal fields on sole risk basis. 
These are all indigenous companies and are taxed at 85% or 67.5% (for the first 5 
years) similar to the companies in the JV. (Sada, Idris & Co, 2013) 
According to the NNPC Annual Report 201215, the share of JVs in crude production 
has decreased from 93% in 2003 to 54% in 2012, while that of PSCs in 2003 was 2% 
and was 37% in 2012. For the same years, the share of Marginal Field/Sole risk 
operators has increased from 3.8% to 7.5%, while there has been a marginal change in 
Service Contracts share in crude production. 
5.1.3 Analysis and Role in Value Creation 
The rationale for Norway to enter into JVs through the SDFI is mainly to direct the 
tempo of oil operations and to ensure that the activities most accurately reflect the 
State’s intentions in managing its petroleum resources. Both of these objectives are 
aimed at capturing more value for the State. 
Nigeria, on the other hand employs various model agreements. One of the main 
reasons for this is the diversity of the availability of the resource base. Unlike Norway, 
where all its reserves are located in deep offshore on the NCS, Nigeria’s reserves are 
located offshore as well as on land. Furthermore, even though the intention to enter 
into JVs was to gain a better control of petroleum activities and technology transfer, at 
which the state didn't quite fare well, the NNPC was falling short of it’s commitment 
for cash calls in the JV agreements with the IOCs. JV agreements are costly for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 NNPC does not fully guarantee the accuracy of the data in the report 
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State as they impose an economic cost even in the exploration phase where the 
chances of finding commercially exploitable reserves are never guaranteed. The State 
thus, took resort of entering into PSCs with IOCs to keep up the investments in the 
upstream sector. PSCs create value for the State as well as the IOC. In a PSC, the 
State bears neither the upfront economic costs of exploration nor the risk associated 
with it, which is completely transferred to the IOC. The IOC, on the other hand does 
not have to pay the resource rent to the State, until it recovers its operational costs. 
Furthermore, in Nigeria, the royalty payments in PSCs can be made in kind, i.e. in the 
form of Royalty Oil or Royalty Gas. While on the one hand, royalty payments in kind 
are useful for Nigeria to supply its domestic allocation and are an important 
instrument for generating revenues to NNPC16, it also creates more risks 
• Selling crude in the market requires some expertise and with Nigeria’s low 
technical capacity, it could rather have the IOCs sell the crude and use the 
cash payments.  
• As will be elaborated in Section 6, the domestic allocation of crude is rather 
wasteful, inefficient and opens more avenues for bunkering and oil theft. 
Nevertheless, there are some positive signs. As has been noted above, the marginal 
fields are given to indigenous companies when they become unprofitable for the big 
IOCs. The growing share of marginal fields in crude production not only indicates 
extraction from fields, which would otherwise be abandoned, but also the increase of 
domestic participation in the petroleum industry. Both of which are good signs of 
value creation. According to the NNPC Annual Report 201217, the amount of crude 
oil lifting by the various model agreements is as follows: 
NNPC - 44%, JV – 24%, PSCs – 24%, independent and sole risk operators – 8% and 
marginal fields – 2%. For the year 2011, Export crude oil sales constitute 57% of total 
export sale value for JVs and 35% for PSC (Sada, Idris & Co, 2013).  
It is however, important to note that the variety of the model agreements introduces 
complexity in administrating and effectuating them, which require good negotiations 
skills and high technical competence. As has been noted previously, technical 
competence is a big shortcoming for Nigeria. Moreover, complexity in contracts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The revenue model of NNPC is complex and the NNPC has no access to its own revenues. 
17 NNPC does not fully guarantee the accuracy of the data. 
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increases the chances of loopholes that can not only be misinterpreted but also 
provide a source for corruption and patronage. 
5.1.4 Summary 
In summary of section 5.1, it can be noted that Norway and Nigeria both employ JVs 
as a non-fiscal instrument to participate in upstream activities. Moreover, this equity 
participation not only gives the State an opportunity to better control the petroleum 
activities, but also opens a revenue stream.  
Additionally, the majority ownership in their NOCs generates more revenues. It 
should also be noted, that Nigeria employs far more diverse set of model agreements 
than Norway to address the difference in location of petroleum reserves and 
opportunities to exploit the reserves. Each type of model agreement bears a different 
equation of risks for the State and the IOC and the context of the reserve potential 
dictates the choice of the instrument. 
5.2 Fiscal Instruments 
5.2.1 Norway 
Norway employs taxation as a fiscal instrument to extract the resource rent from 
petroleum activities. 
Taxation on petroleum activities 
A company operating within the Norwegian borders and performing petroleum 
activities is taxed under the Norwegian Petroleum Tax Act Section 1 to a total of 78% 
tax. Of this, 28% forms the corporate income tax liable to any company operating in 
Norway. The remaining 50% is a special tax for petroleum activities carried offshore 
on the NCS. A special allowance is made in the form of capital uplift that gives 
depreciation allowance for a period of six years and can be deducted from the special 
tax of 50%. This makes the tax regime neutral and non –distortive such that projects 
that have a positive NPV before taxation also remain profitable after applying tax. 
The Petroleum Price Council sets a norm price for the petroleum produced and sold 
by affiliated companies operating in Norway. The norm price is used to calculate the 
taxable income. The norm price is derived in consensus through meetings with oil 
companies and differs for the different grades of oil and natural gas. 
Area fee 
The rationale behind the area fee as a fiscal instrument is to encourage petroleum 
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activities in an awarded area. For an area that lacks production or any active 
exploration, the companies are charged 30,000 NOK18s per km2 for the first year, 
increasing to 60,000 NOKs per km2 in the second year and to the ceiling amount of 
120,000 NOKs per km2 for the third year. The fees are steep but companies can apply 
for exemption by submitting a Plan for Development and Operation to the MPE. 
Environmental Taxes 
Norway is a member of the European Union - Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
and therefore requires petroleum activities to comply with emission quotas. 
Companies are required to purchase emissions quotas for their activities on the NCS 
for each tonne of CO2 emitted. The price/tonne of CO2 is based on the market price.  
Additionally, even before participating in the EU-ETS, the CO2 tax was introduced in 
1991 as a policy instrument to reduce emissions of CO2 from the petroleum activities. 
The tax applies for every standard cubic metre (Sm3) of gas that is burned or released 
directly, and every litre of petroleum burned. For 2013, the tax is set at NOK 0.96 per 
litre of petroleum or standard cubic metre of gas. (NPD, 2013) 
Application Fees 
The licensees pay the following administrative fees for processing the various 
applications. These are as follows: 
Seismic Surveys – 33,000 NOKS 
Exploration Permits- 65,000 NOKS 
Extraction Permits 109,000 NOKS 
5.2.2 Nigeria 
Signature Bonuses 
Signature bonuses are defined as payments made by the IOCs to the State on agreeing 
to carry out the model agreements. 
Al-Atar & Alomair (2005) gives the different values for signature bonuses in Nigeria. 
The signature bonus is $5 million for onshore production. The signature bonuses for 
offshore differ with depth starting at $10 million for depths upto 100 and 200 meters, 
$20 million respectively for 201- 500 meters, 801-1000 meters and in excess of 1000 
meters. It is the highest for 501 - 800 meters at $25 million. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 1 Norwegian Kroner (NOK) = 0.16 US Dollars (USD) as of June 2014. 
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Royalty 
A royalty payment is due on every month on each producing concession by an 
operating oil company engaged in upstream operations an agreed percentage of oil 
produced after the adjustments for expenses related to treatment and handling.  
Different royalty rates prevail for joint venture operations. They are as follows: 
 
Table 7: Signature Bonuses and Royalties for offshore regions: Nigeria 
Depth in meters Royalty Rate Signature Bonus 
On shore production 0mts 20% $5 million 
Production in territorial 
waters and continental 
shelf up to 100 meters 
water depth 
18.5% $10 million 
Offshore production 
beyond 100 meters and 
upto 200 meters 
16.67% $10 million 
In areas from 201 to 500 
meters water depth 
12% $20 million 
In areas from 501 to 800 
meters water depth 
8% $25 million 
In areas from 801 to 1000 
meters water depth 
4% $20 million 
In areas in excess of 1000 
meters water depth 
0% $20 million 
Inland Basin 10% No data available 
Source: Authors own based on Al-Atar & Alomair (2005) 
Resource Rent Tax  
The resource rent tax payable to the state is as follows: 
• OPL entails NGN19200.00 for each km2 or part thereof  
• A nonproducing OML entails NGN300.00 for each km2 or part thereof  
• A producing OML entails NGN500.00 for each km2 or part thereof  
Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT) 
The petroleum profit tax rate is 85% for all operations and is levied for all companies 
registered in Nigeria and engaged in upstream operations. However it is reduced to 
65.75% for a period of five years for new companies until all the pre-production 
capital expenditure has been amortised. 
Gas Flare Penalty 
The penalty is imposed on oil companies engaged in flaring of associated gas during 
petroleum operations. The penalty is set to be a deterrent for wasting the resource. On 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 1 Nigerian Naira (NGN) = 0.0061 US Dollars (USD) as of June 2014. 
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August 15, 2011, the penalty was raised from NGN 10 to $3.5 per square cubic feet of 
gas (Business Day Online, 2013). 
5.2.3 Analysis and Role in Value Creation 
Norway traditionally employed taxation as a fiscal regime for industrial activities, so 
when the petroleum sector came online, it already had the expertise to administer it 
(Al- Kasim, 2006). Norway is able to demand and justify a high tax rate of 78% on 
petroleum activities as a function of transparency, streamlined processes and quality 
of reserves. Nevertheless, the State tries to attract investment by providing a capital 
uplift that make the tax system neutral for investors. In this manner, the State is able 
to extract a large portion of the resource rent. However, Al- Kasim (2006) and 
Osmundsen (1998) both criticise the risk of giving a high tax incentive to companies. 
Both argue that a high level of tax incentive does not compel cost-efficiency and 
could provide the IOC with perverse incentives to pass other costs to benefit from the 
tax incentive. However, Norway’s reserves on the NCS are maturing and EOR 
operations do increase the E&P cost so the incentives do have some merit. 
Through the area fees, the State is able to give impetus to accelerate exploration 
operations and thus result in early finds. The environmental taxation was created to 
minimise the negative impact of petroleum activities on the environment. However, a 
positive side effect was that it allowed Statoil to carve a niche in technological 
innovations related to Carbon, Capture and Storage (CCS) for petroleum activities.  
Osmundsen (1998) characterises Norway as a risk seeking country, as the government 
seems to bear more risk than to mitigate it. The primary contentions for the author’s 
conclusions were the abolishing of the sliding scale and carrying costs, with an SDFI 
interest of 80%, the state bears economic risk and Statoil’s full state ownership meant 
that it’s risk portfolio was not diversified other than the NCS. The last contention has 
changed and Statoil was partially privatised to exactly address this issue. In the figure 
below, it can be clearly noted that Norway has managed to capture the bulk of the 
resource rent over time. It also indicates the share of the different fiscal and non-fiscal 
instruments in generating economic value for Norway.  
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Figure 6: Government take from petroleum: Norway 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Norway 
The important observations from the graph are as follows: 
• The government take on petroleum activities is increasing over time. This 
means Norway is able to capture more economic value from its resource base. 
• Taxation is the instrument that has been generating the highest value over time, 
closely followed by SDFI. 
• The resource rent is a function of oil prices and petroleum production. 
• Dividends from Statoil are also becoming significant from the 2000s, this 
indicates increased activity from international operations. 
For Nigeria on the other hand, Signature Bonuses present upfront payments and adds 
to the State revenues. Moreover, the sliding scale of the different royalty payments 
gives good incentives to IOCs to undertake deep offshore upstream activities. 
Moreover, the PPT helps capture a good share of the resource rent while also allowing 
the relaxed tax rate for IOCs to recover their pre-production capital expenditure.  
The table below summarises the various financial flows for Nigeria. 	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Table 8: Financial Flows through Petroleum Production 2006 - 2011: Nigeria
Source: Author’s own based on data from NEITI, 2013 
The final row illustrates the proportion of economic value generated (or lost) via the 
various channels each year. The deep coloured bars indicate the channel that has the 
highest (or lowest) value. It should be noted that the figures in red indicate no 
available data. As can be noted from above, sales of crude oil and gas create the most 
economic value for Nigeria followed by the PPTs and the Royalties. On the other 
hand, PSCs in kind payments and cash calls to finance the JV investments create 
negative value. It is also noteworthy to observe that the government take is very 
dependent on the crude production. A dip in production resulted in a dip in creation of 
economic value between 2008 and 200920. 
5.2.4 Summary 
In summary of Section 5.2, it can be noted that for both countries, the fiscal 
instruments are a function of domestic petroleum production and also create 
significant economic value. Also, taxation creates the biggest economic value for 
Norway, followed by SDFI, while for Nigeria; it is the crude oil and gas sales 
followed by taxes that generate the highest economic value. 
5.3 Fiscal Policies aiding in bracing for impact 
5.3.1 Norway 
Government Pension Fund Global 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 It should be refreshed that instability and militant activity in the Niger Delta, resulted in a loss of 
production to an all time low at 1.6 million barrels/day from an expected capacity of 2.5 million 
barrels/day. 
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As was noted in Section 4.1.1 on history of oil industry in Norway, the Norwegian 
government created the Petroleum Fund to cushion the economy from oil price 
volatility. The fund was renamed the Government Pension Fund Global in 2006 to 
highlight the objective of providing for future public pension costs. The fund has a 
diverse investment portfolio and invests internationally to avoid domestic inflation 
and thereby the Dutch Disease for other industries. All of the petroleum revenues, 
generated from the various fiscal and non-fiscal instruments, as discussed above, are 
deposited in the fund. Withdrawals can be made from the fund into the State budget to 
cover for the non-oil fiscal deficit. However, the withdrawals are capped at 4% of the 
Fund’s value annually. Ending 2013, the fund was valued at 5206 billion NOKs 
(Ministry of Finance, 2014). 
5.3.2 Nigeria 
Excess Crude Account 
In 2004, the Excess Crude Account (ECA) was created to act as a fiscal reserve for 
Nigeria to cushion the economy from the volatility of oil prices by acting as a 
stabilizing fund and to also fund development of infrastructure projects (SWF 
Institute, 2014). A benchmark price for oil is considered and oil revenues over and 
above the benchmark price are pooled into the ECA so that in the event of price 
volatility, the ECA can be used to bridge the gap between the actual oil income and 
the budgeted one. For 2013, the benchmark price of oil was $79 (EIA, 2013).  
Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority 
The ECA is not protected for withdrawals and has no legal backing, which led to the 
creation of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA) in October 2011. 
The NSIA is the body responsible for the investments of the Sovereign Wealth Fund 
(SWF) of Nigeria. The SWF is composed of three distinct funds; A Stabilisation Fund 
to act as an economic buffer, a Future Generations Fund to pass the benefits of 
petroleum to future generations and the Nigeria Infrastructure Fund to invest in 
infrastructure for promoting economic growth. Each fund in the NSIA is legally 
protected under the NSIA Act (NSIA, 2014). 
5.3.3 Analysis and Role in Value Creation 
Norway’s GPFG is another anecdotal example of the State’s well-functioning 
Sovereign Wealth Fund. It lived up to it’s expectation of being able to cushion the 
Norwegian economy not only from the oil price volatility but also helped minimise 
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the impacts of the economic downturn of 2008. Nigeria’s ECA on the other hand also 
helped smooth out the GDP growth rate after it’s inception in 2005. Now NSIA is 
aimed to create more value by acting as an economic buffer, a fund for future 
generations as well as a fund to accelerate infrastructure development. 
5.4 Conclusion – Role of Fiscal Regimes in Value Creation 
Following an institutional setup to attract and engage IOCs in undertaking petroleum 
activities for the State, the fiscal regimes are required to extract the maximum of the 
resource rent so as to derive economic value from it. Nevertheless, the State has to 
balance the fine ambition of extracting the maximum value from the economic rent 
while ensuring that the fiscal terms do not penalise the IOC for investing in petroleum 
activities. As Aye (2013) points out, the design of the fiscal regimes is instrumental in 
pitching the value proposition of the petroleum sector to the IOC. Fiscal regimes 
design is thus a crucial aspect of value creation in the petroleum sector. 
Norway’s main fiscal instrument is taxation, which also captures the biggest portion 
of the resource rent for the State. The second instrument that captures the most rent 
for Norway is the SDFI, which is how the State participates in the JV agreements 
while maintaining the tempo of petroleum activities. The share of dividends from 
Statoil is also becoming significant after the partial privatisation. Moreover, the early 
manoeuvre to create an economic buffer from oil price volatility has resulted in the 
largest Sovereign Wealth Fund in the world (SWF Institute, 2014). Overtime, 
Norway’s fiscal design has indeed helped in capturing the most of the resource rent. 
Nigeria’s fiscal design is quite diverse. However, the choice of the model agreements 
is geared at keeping the tempo of the petroleum activities and is catered to address the 
risks involved in the diversity of the resource base. Nigeria has soundly adopted PSCs 
to lower risk and create favourable terms for itself and the IOC. Moreover, opening 
up the marginal fields to indigenous companies has created value in building domestic 
capacity as well as exploiting the resource in the marginal fields. For Nigeria, the sale 
of crude oil and gas creates the most value followed by the very high PPT of 85%. 
Nigeria’s economic buffer, the ECA has helped cushion the economy however 
problems of low technical capacity in administering the regime could affect the value 
that is actually derived from the resource.  
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6 Factors affecting value creation 
 
The previous sections threw light on the factors in the institutional frameworks and 
fiscal regimes that create value for Norway and Nigeria by managing their petroleum 
resources. This section is devoted entirely to factors that affect value creation, which 
cannot be completely classified under either institutional frameworks or fiscal 
regimes and which are rather unique to the countries under this study. It is important 
to highlight these factors as they do have some overlaps with the institutional design 
and fiscal regimes, which directly affect the petroleum sector.  
6.1 Nigerian Cost Factor 	  
Al-Kasim (2006) introduced the term, ‘The Norwegian Cost Factor’ to denote the 
additional costs incurred by the IOCs operating on the Norwegian side of the NCS as 
opposed to the UK side due to additional constraints of adding local content and 
technology participation. Inspired by the term, this part presents some of the factors, 
unique to Nigeria, that impose additional costs and thereby create negative value for 
the State and the IOC. These factors are collectively called ‘The Nigerian Cost 
Factor’. 
6.1.1 Fuel Subsidy 
Subsidies on fuel are a common feature of developing countries aimed at protecting 
its people from oil price volatility in the international markets. For net oil-exporting 
countries, fuel subsidies represent a means of benefiting from the country’s resources. 
However, they are costly for the State, as it has to absorb the price volatility. 
Moreover, as the people of the State presume subsidy as their right to exploit their 
own resource, it gives less incentive to minimise wasteful consumption. The same is 
true in the case of Nigeria, however there are rather unique factors that make the 
subsidy situation interesting as well as complicated and therefore negates value 
creation. These are as follows: 
• Nigeria has the lowest net electricity production per capita with more than 
50% of the population without access to electricity (IEA, 2013a). 30% of the 
required electricity is produced through domestic gasoline and diesel 
generators, which are not only inefficient but also dirty (Harvard, 2010). This 
increases the demand for refined products and the lack of domestic refining 
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capacity means that they have to be imported. Moreover, the products are 
further subsidised, which in 2011 alone, cost the State $8 million21 (Moyo & 
Songwe, 2012).  
• As Thurber et.al (2010) point out, artificially low prices in Nigeria encourage 
diversion of products to neighbouring countries thereby creating fuel scarcity 
in the domestic market, which further creates a black market. 
In an effort to gain more value for the State through the value lost in fuel subsidies, 
President Goodluck Jonathan announced removal of the fuel subsidy in January 2012. 
The news was met with nation-wide protests as prices per litre of gasoline rose from 
$0.40 in December 2011 to $0.88 in January 2012, a significant amount for a low to 
middle income country like Nigeria (National Geographic News, 2012).  
6.1.2 Pipeline Vandalism, Oil Theft and Bunkering 
Pipeline vandalism and the resulting oil theft and bunkering are unique characteristics 
of the Nigerian petroleum sector and no paper focusing on the Nigerian petroleum 
sector is complete without the mention of this phenomena. The phenomenon is so 
pronounced that even the NNPC acknowledges pipeline vandalisms in its annual 
reports and notes it as the single most critical challenge before the Nigerian petroleum 
industry. The pipeline grid is 5001 kms in length and connects storage depots to 
refineries; act as a transport medium for crude inflow to the ports and the refineries 
along with flow of refined products from the import terminals (Okoli & Orinya, 2013). 
Pipeline vandalisms have taken the form of organised crimes, mostly undertaken by 
the militant groups who steal the crude oil. It can take range from pipeline disruptions 
via explosions to drilling holes in the pipes to steal the crude. The frequency and 
intensity of incidences is alarming with 499 cases reported in 1999 alone. The 2012 
Annual report of NNPC22, records a total of 2256 line breaks of which 2230 were due 
to vandalism, 26 due to system deterioration and 34 due to fires (which are currently 
under investigation).  
Oil-Bunkering is a form of oil theft. The activities range from drilling holes and 
siphoning crude in the Delta to sell in “domestic refineries”, to barges being filled at 
well-heads and crude shipments reaching refineries as far as China, and finally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 2011 US Dollars 
22 The NNPC does not fully guarantee accuracy of the data in this report. 
	   66	  
“white-collar” bunkering in which tankers are directly filled at the export terminals 
and the metering systems manipulated.  
The scale of the theft is industrial, as is pointed out by Chatam House (Financial 
Times, 2014). The view is also shared by Patrick Dele Cole, businessman, former 
ambassador and former international adviser to President Obasanjo, who states that 
the oil theft in the Delta makes it the 12th largest oil producer in Africa with revenues 
exceeding the GDP of 15 different African countries. A NEITI audit report evaluated 
the total losses $10.9 billion dollars due to oil thefts and vandalisms between 2009 -
2011 alone (Okoli & Orinya, 2013). This alone contributes to large negative value 
creation. 
6.1.3 Analysis and Impact on Value Creation 
It is clear that fuel subsidies create negative economic value for the State. The State 
could instead have invested the money in creating more social value in terms of 
investing in education, infrastructure etc. Faith Birol, chief economist at IEA, 
confirms that the subsidies aimed at benefiting the poor only create marginal 
economic value by stating, "Only 8 percent of the $409 billion spent on fossil-fuel 
subsidies in 2010 was distributed to the poorest 20 percent of the 
population"(National Geographic News, 2012). The black markets spawned by the 
artificially low prices, further create market distortions and create negative value not 
only for the State and but also for the society. 
Having looked at the scale of vandalisms and oil thefts, it could be easy to picture 
why it can be categorised under the Nigerian Cost Factor. For oil companies, this 
means a huge drop in daily production. Shell, the biggest IOC operating in Nigeria, 
reported a loss in production between 100,000 b/d – 400, 000 b/d amounting to looses 
of $250 million from it’s earnings between April – June, 2014 alone (Financial Times, 
2014). Oil theft has compelled Shell to divest it’s stocks in Nigeria by selling 8 blocks 
in the Delta to Nigerian companies since 2010 (Financial Times, 2013). Moreover, 
since Shell is also one of the operator for the pipelines, it has to bear the penalty of 
accidents happening on the pipelines it is responsible for, under the Oil Pipeline Act 
1956 as amended in 1965 (NEITI, 2010). This imposes additional costs on the 
company for something that it is not entirely responsible for. Additionally, oil spills 
could also arise due to technical failures arising from sustaining repeated attacks on 
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infrastructure, which could further invite reputational risks. These factors create 
negative value for the company and makes business environment risky and 
unattractive. 
The oil thefts create negative value for the State as well. As has been noted earlier, the 
economic losses are huge. Nevertheless, because it creates very high risks, it could 
affect investments by the IOCs in the long term. As Nigeria lacks technical capacity 
in exploiting it’s oil reserves, this creates negative value in the long term. 
Additionally, it causes environmental degradation and loss of human lives, which 
impose additional social costs to the State (Okoli & Orinya, 2013). These factors can 
thus, be said to create negative social value. 
Other factors that could also be thought of as increasing the Nigerian Cost Factor are 
as follows: 
• Out-dated regulations and protocols lead to longer timespan for project 
approvals, as no framework exists to address new developments. 
• Low technical capacity leading to administrative inefficiencies also increases 
the time taken for project approvals. 
Both of these factors not only push the value creation to a later date but also give 
room to a lot of uncertainty, which compels the use of a higher discount rate. This in 
turn places less value on future value creation and thereby increases the opportunity 
costs associated with resources tied up in projects pending approval. 
6.1.4 Summary 
As a summary to section 6.2, it can be noted that fuel subsidy and oil thefts are the 
biggest factors of the Nigerian Cost Factor that create negative value for the state. The 
circumstances around fuel subsidy are complex and require interventions on a broader 
energy policy level. Oil theft is rather serious issue in Nigeria and has been 
burgeoning since the 2000s. Oil- theft is almost operating as a parallel industry in 
Nigeria cutting into the production and creating value only for the few involved in the 
process. 
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6.2 Conclusion – Factors affecting value creation 
Nigeria has a big challenge in containing negative value creation that arises due to the 
Nigerian Cost Factor. Fuel subsidy is already eating into government budgets, with 
the state allocating as much as $6 billion for subsidy payments in 2014 (National 
Geographic News, 2014). However, it should be noted that reforms have to be made 
to address the real issue that creates negative value. Leveraging the natural gas 
resources for electricity production could potentially reduce the dependence on 
refined products and subsequently reduce demand. This could further have positive 
implications in lowering the proliferation of the black markets and also decrease 
spending by the State on subsiding refined products.  
Addressing, the oil theft and vandalism is a serious issue that needs immediate 
attention. Refreshing from the very first section that provided a lens for analysis, it 
puts into perspective the historic implications that are responsible for the status quo in 
the Niger Delta. Marginalised communities suffering environmental degradation and 
loss of alternative employments took into their own hands to get a piece of the pie 
from the oil produced in their region. Also, sustained agitations over austerity cuts in 
the late 80s took a militant turn in the 90s. What started off as a will to gain benefit 
from being host communities has spiralled out of control and has spawned a parallel 
industry that neither creates value for the State nor the local communities while still 
imposing greater social costs. The oil theft situation is creating negative value for all 
stakeholders involved, be it the IOCs operating, the host communities, the 
environment and even the State. The only value it creates is for the small group of 
people who are involved in the bunkering process, however the cost to society is huge. 
Moreover delays and systemic inefficiencies lead to a higher discount rate for projects 
pending approvals and increases opportunity costs. 
It can thus be observed that the unique factors contributing to the Nigerian Cost 
Factor do have an impact on value creation. These factors do not neatly fit under the 
institutional frameworks or the fiscal regimes but interplay in it’s dynamics 
nevertheless.  
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7 Conclusion and Future Outlook 
The motivation of this paper arose from a comparative graph of the GDP growth rates 
of Norway and Nigeria, two countries with similarities in their respective petroleum 
sectors yet exhibiting a big diversity in the petroleum sector performance. The paper 
thus sought an explanation for this difference in performance. The literature review 
pointed towards the role of institutional frameworks in petroleum sector performance 
while discounting the effect of oil price shocks on macroeconomic activity of 
petroleum dependent economies.  
The paper thus endeavoured to focus on the aspects that are responsible for value 
creation in the petroleum industry. The core focus of the paper has been the role of 
institutional frameworks and fiscal design in value creation while gaining a better 
insight into the petroleum industries of Norway and Nigeria. The paper also 
introduced ‘The Nigerian Cost Factor’. The aim of the paper was to analyse what 
factors create value and in what manner. Quantifying the value creation is outside the 
scope of this paper. 
The aim of the institutional framework is to provide an ecosystem for carrying out 
petroleum activities. While studying the evolution of the oil industry in Norway and 
Nigeria, a striking observation is the effect of historic factors on the status quo of the 
institutional frameworks. It would be fair to say that Norway has been lucky with 
favourable terms and policy interventions coming in at the right time to maximise the 
value creation. Nigeria on the other hand, survived through periods of political 
instability that created short time horizons for the policy makers who tried to 
“organise” the industry so as to seek favourable terms for themselves and not the 
State as a whole. Nigerian petroleum sector has thus exhibited the classic ‘Roving 
Bandit Effect’. It should also be noted that Norway’s model of separation of functions 
in the petroleum sector has been instrumental in creating a high-performing sector, 
which has indeed created more value for the State. Nigerian petroleum sector has 
witnessed a lot of shuffling but has, so far, only created more ambiguity and 
duplication of functions resulting in institutional inefficiencies. 
Norway has been able to leverage synergies between Statoil and domestic competitor 
Norsk Hydro to control most of the high performing reserves on the NCS. Also, when 
the State did intervene in the functions of the NOC, it was to ensure more favourable 
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terms to propel Statoil into achieving technical competencies on par with its IOC 
peers. Nigeria on the other hand lost sight of building technical competencies while 
paradoxically placing NNPC at the centre stage. Statoil plays a purely commercial 
role, with the State merely being a majority shareholder with minimal interference. 
NNPC however sits at the complicated political nexus between the State and the IOC, 
neither having financial independence nor the benefit of making independent 
commercial decisions. 
In terms of technical capacity, Norway has been prudent to create and enforce 
regulations to gradually reduce dependence on IOC know-how to manage its 
petroleum resources. Nigeria has failed to do through its NOC. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that Nigeria did make strides learning through its OPEC colleagues and 
gained higher equity participation, the same way that Norway learnt through UK’s 
experience. However, political instability and patronage becoming inextricable part of 
the petroleum operations have eaten into the value created for Nigeria. 
Norway benefits from having not only a homogenous population, resources in similar 
geological terrains of the deep-shore but also prior industry experience. Nigeria 
possess neither, which further complicate the value creation dynamics. Norway 
therefore benefits from having a streamlined model agreements framework for 
engaging with the IOCs. Nigeria on the other hand, and rightly so, indulged in various 
model agreements based on the risk associated with developing the resource. This has 
been instrumental in increasing indigenous participation and development of marginal 
fields. While it does create value in creating more domestic capacity, it should be 
observed that the domestic companies would be fragmented and it would still be a 
while before one competent champion emerges among them to compete on level 
grounds with the IOCs. Additionally, the royalty payments in kind do impose the risk 
of marketing the crude but it helps assuage NNPC’s revenue model to some extent. 
A sound business environment is also the reason that Norway seems more attractive 
for investment decisions than Nigeria, which is still plagued by oil thefts, militancy 
and conflicts increasing the Nigerian Cost Factor and negating value. Other factors 
such as longer times to process applications in Nigeria also add to the cost factor and 
makes investing in already risky projects, a cumbersome exercise. 
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While the fiscal regimes in Norway and Nigeria are both sound and do seem to create 
a lot of economic value for the States, the regime administering capacity on Nigeria’s 
end makes one wonder if the State is actually able to extract the rent that it’s own 
regimes make theoretically possible. 
It has thus been found that a lot of factors create, affect and negate value in the 
Norwegian and the Nigerian petroleum industry. It has also been found that 
institutional frameworks and fiscal regimes, directly affecting the petroleum industry 
are complementary and a good design of both leads to greater value creation. 
Moreover, there are other aspects that do influence value creation and care should be 
exercised while addressing these and yet maximising social welfare. 
Future Outlook 
Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global has proved to be an anecdotal example 
and Nigeria’s three promising SWFs do present an exciting outlook. It only remains 
to be seen how they evolve and what function do they actually end up serving in value 
creation. Also in the light of dwindling domestic reserves and the habitual securities 
of the welfare state, it remains to be seen how Norway leverages its transformed 
resource wealth to sustain the economy and the high standard of living.  
Nigeria’s petroleum sector organisational inefficiencies have been recognised and 
efforts are being made to restructure and reorganise it through the Petroleum Industry 
Bill. However, the Bill has been in contention since 2007 and has yet to become a law, 
this has led to uncertainty in the business environment as some provisions of the bill 
prove unfavourable terms to the IOCs. It could be possible that the Nigerian analysis 
presented in this paper could be obviated by the developments introduced if the bill 
indeed becomes a law. For now, it remains to be seen if the Bill follows the path of 
NNPC restructuring exercises in the past or leads to a progressive petroleum industry. 
Scope for Extension 
This paper has presented the value creation factors in the petroleum industry for 
Norway and Nigeria in a qualitative sense to restrict the scope while giving a broad 
overview. An interesting research could result from quantifying the value that each of 
the factors discussed actually contribute and how the State uses these values.   
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